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Abstract 
I investigate whether bank supervision is effective in enforcing written rules on the 
estimations of the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) consistently between public 
and private banks, which have different intensity of incentives to misreport the ALLL. 
Results suggest that bank supervision of the ALLL estimations was effective between 2002 
and 2012, but has become lax recently. State-chartered public banks underestimated the 
ALLL by about 13% annually between 2013 and 2015. Bank regulators are willing to cater 
to banks’ private interests when the economic environment is good and the regulatory 
emphasis is weak, but not during the crisis.  
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1 Introduction 
Is bank supervision effective to ensure that banks comply with written regulations?2 
Since the 2008 financial crisis, effective bank supervision is no longer taken for granted. 
Lax supervisory practices existed beforehand and are blamed for several high-profiled bank 
failures during the crisis. Recently, weaknesses in the institutional design of bank 
supervision also surface, casting doubt on the effectiveness of bank supervision. For 
example, Agarwal et al. (2014) find that state regulators are more lenient than federal 
regulators when assigning the CAMELS ratings to the same state-chartered banks. Rezende 
(2014) finds that both federal and state regulators assign more favorable CAMELS ratings 
to banks that switch charters to the regulators’ jurisdictions.      
Although these findings suggest that bank regulators do not consistently enforce 
written rules that govern the CAMELS ratings, they do not directly address the question of 
whether bank regulators effectively enforce written regulations that govern the banks’ 
behaviors. As a result, three questions still remain. First, is supervisory laxity a widespread 
phenomenon? Second, do the institutional design weaknesse have an impact on supervisory 
effectiveness? And third, does supervisory laxity vary over time?  
Because banking regulations are numerous and no single variable can summarize 
banks’ compliance with all regulations, in this study, I address these questions by 
examining a common and important supervisory target: the allowance for loan and lease 
losses (ALLL). The reported ALLL is a direct and observable outcome of bank supervision. 
It covers estimated credit losses in a bank’s loan and lease (hereafter “loan”) portfolio. All 
                                                          
2 The definitions of bank regulation and supervision in this paper follow the Federal Reserve’s. Bank 
regulation refers to “the written rules that define acceptable behavior and conduct for financial institutions.” 
Bank supervision refers to “the enforcement of these rules.” (https://www.stlouisfed.org/in-plain-
english/introduction-to-supervision-and-regulation) 
   
3 
 
domestic banks with lending activities must follow written regulatory guidance to estimate 
the ALLL and document the estimation methodology for bank examiners’ regular review. 
The bank examiners make the final determination on whether the level of the ALLL is 
appropriate.  
The ALLL is also subject to misreporting, making it a suitable candidate for studying 
the effectiveness of bank supervision. Allocations to the ALLL via loan loss provisioning 
reduce banks’ current-period earnings, and the impact of provisioning on earnings is pro-
cyclical. During a credit expansion, when bank profits are high, banks have few problems 
collecting loan payments from borrowers. The level of the estimated ALLL is low and the 
allocation of net interest income to the ALLL is small. However, in an economic downturn, 
when bank profits are already under pressure, the level of the estimated ALLL also 
increases and the proportion of net interest income allocated to the ALLL is large. As a 
result, when bank profitability is high, banks have incentives to overestimate the ALLL to 
smooth out the cyclical impact of loan loss provisioning on earnings (Kanagaretnam et al. 
2004; Liu and Ryan 2006). When bank profitability is low, banks have incentives to 
underestimate the ALLL to preserve earnings and minimize the negative impact of earnings 
declines on equity capital (Huizinga and Laeven 2012).  
Because no benchmark exists for evaluating whether bank supervision of the ALLL 
estimations is effective, I compare the ALLL estimations between public and private banks 
to gain an inference to the open question. Because periodic performance measures, such as 
earnings and equity capital, are more important to public banks than to private banks, the 
incentives to misreport the ALLL are intensified among public banks (e.g., Balla and Rose 
2015; Beatty et al. 2002). Effective bank supervision should restrict banks from 
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misreporting the ALLL, no matter how incentivized the banks are. If bank supervision is 
effective, banks will report the same level of the ALLL regardless of whether they are 
publicly listed. Otherwise, if supervisory laxity is present, banks’ private interests are 
catered to. Because public banks are more incentivized to misreport the ALLL, when bank 
profitability is high, public banks will overestimate the ALLL relative to their private 
counterfactuals. But when bank profitability is under pressure, public banks will 
underestimate the ALLL relative to their private counterfactuals.  
Because the directions banks take to misreport the ALLL vary with the banks’ 
financial strength, I examine bank supervision of the ALLL estimations over three periods 
of different economic and regulatory environments. The first period runs from 2002 to 
2007. During this pre-crisis period, bank profitability was high and the regulatory emphasis 
on compliant ALLL estimations was strong. Between 2001 and 2006, three policy 
statements on the ALLL estimations were issued, requiring banks to estimate the ALLL in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), essentially reinforcing 
the “incurred loss” model. The second period covers the recent financial crisis from 2008 
to 2009, when bank profitability reached historical lows. During the last period from 2010 
to 2015, the economy was in recovery. Since 2013, the proportions of problem loans held 
by banks have fallen to pre-crisis levels. But because of rising regulatory compliance costs 
and squeezed interest margins, bank profitability is still under pressure. Unlike the first 
period, the last two periods were not associated with a similarly strong regulatory emphasis 
on compliant ALLL estimations.  
Based on the relation between bank profitability and their incentives to misreport the 
ALLL, I predict that if supervisory laxity was present, public banks would overestimate 
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the ALLL relative to their private counterfactuals between 2002 and 2007, despite the 
strong regulatory emphasis on compliant ALLL estimations during the period. But public 
banks would underestimate the ALLL relative to their private counterfactuals between 
2008 and 2015. If bank supervision of the ALLL estimations was effective, we should 
observe no ALLL differences between these two types of banks over the entire sample 
period. 
The empirical challenge is that the counterfactuals of public banks are unobservable. 
The observed ALLL differences between public and private banks cannot provide unbiased 
inference about whether bank supervision is effective, because they are confounded by 
institutional and loan portfolio characteristics that are associated with both the banks’ 
listing decisions and their ALLL estimations. To estimate the unbiased effect of reporting 
incentives due to public listing on the ALLL estimations, I sample public and private banks 
at the end of each calendar year from 2002 to 2015 and use a weighting method proposed 
in Li and Greene (2013) to balance 55 covariates that capture institutional and loan 
portfolio differences between public and private banks. The 55 covariates are constructed 
around the key inputs in the ALLL estimation process as outlined in the regulatory 
guidance and are closely related to institutional factors affecting banks’ listing decisions. 
The weighting method achieves better covariate balance than propensity score matching 
and creates a pseudo-population of public and private banks from which the unbiased effect 
can be estimated.  
The results suggest that bank supervision of the ALLL estimations was effective 
between 2002 and 2012, but became lax between 2013 and 2015. Between 2002 and 2005, 
public banks only slightly overestimate the ALLL relative to private banks. The 
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overestimations range from $0.0004 to $0.0006 per dollar of total loans. The 
overestimations disappear in 2006 and 2007. During the crisis period between 2008 and 
2009, public banks do not underestimate the ALLL relative to private banks. The ALLL 
estimations between public and private banks do not differ in 2008, and public banks 
overestimate the ALLL by $0.0010 per dollar of total loans in 2009. During the post-crisis 
period from 2010 to 2012, the ALLL estimations do not differ between public and private 
banks. However, between 2013 and 2015, public banks underestimate the ALLL by 
$0.0016, $0.0015, and $0.0013 per dollar of total loans, respectively.  
I conduct three additional tests to confirm that the variations of the ALLL differences 
between public and private banks over the sample period result from changes in 
supervisory effectiveness. First, I use the insight from Agarwal et al. (2014) that state 
regulators are more lenient than federal regulators to test whether the ALLL 
overestimations by public banks between 2002 and 2005 and the ALLL underestimations 
by public banks between 2013 and 2015 are due to supervisory laxity. If bank supervision 
was lax in these years, more supervisory laxity, in terms of larger ALLL differences 
between public and private banks, would occur between state-chartered public and private 
banks than between federally chartered public and private banks, and between state-
chartered public and private banks located in more leniently supervised states than between 
state-chartered public and private banks located in less leniently supervised states.  
The results confirm such predictions. Between 2002 and 2005, only state-chartered 
public banks, but not federally chartered public banks, overestimate the ALLL. The 
overestimations range from $0.0005 to $0.0007 per dollar of total loans. During the same 
period, state-chartered public banks located in more leniently supervised states 
   
7 
 
overestimate the ALLL in 2003 and 2005 by $0.0010 and $0.0008 per dollar of total loans, 
respectively, whereas state-chartered public banks located in less leniently supervised 
states only overestimate the ALLL in 2005 by $0.0004 per dollar of total loans. Given that 
the ALLL overestimations among all state-chartered banks remain small, I conclude that 
bank supervision of the ALLL estimations was effective between 2002 and 2005.  
Between 2013 and 2015, federally chartered public banks only underestimate the 
ALLL in 2014 and 2015 by $0.0009 and $0.0007 per dollar of total loans, respectively. But 
state-chartered public banks underestimate the ALLL in all three years, and the 
underestimations are much larger, averaging $0.0022, $0.0016, and $0.0015 per dollar of 
total loans, respectively. In these three years, state-chartered public banks located in more 
leniently supervised states also underestimate the ALLL more than state-chartered public 
banks located in less leniently supervised states. In addition, state-chartered public banks 
located in more leniently supervised states start to underestimate the ALLL in 2012, one 
year earlier than state-chartered public banks located in less leniently supervised states. 
These results support the conclusion that bank supervision of the ALLL estimations has 
become lax recently. 
Next, I pin down effective bank supervision as the sole reason for the undetected 
underestimations by public banks during the financial crisis and the insignificant ALLL 
differences between public and private banks during the rest of the sample period. First, 
based on the previous tests, the ALLL overestimation by public banks in 2009 is not 
associated with supervisory leniency. Neither state-chartered public banks nor state-
chartered public banks located in more leniently supervised states overestimate the ALLL 
relative to their private counterparts. But state-chartered public banks located in less 
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leniently supervised states overestimate the ALLL by $0.0009 per dollar of total loans. 
These results are inconsistent with the claim that the ALLL overestimation by public banks 
in 2009 is due to the “big bath” reporting behavior, which is more likely to occur under the 
supervision of more lenient bank regulators.  
Second, I rule out stock market discipline as an alternative explanation for the results. 
I use the percentage of institutional ownership, the institutional ownership Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI), and the number of block owners as proxies to measure the 
intensity of institutional monitoring, which is the cornerstone of stock market discipline. I 
do not find consistent evidence suggesting that public banks exposed to a higher intensity 
of institutional monitoring overestimate or underestimate the ALLL relative to public 
banks exposed to a lower intensity of institutional monitoring throughout the entire sample 
period. Stock market discipline is absent with regard to banks’ ALLL estimations. 
Effective bank supervision is responsible for the undetected underestimations by public 
banks during the financial crisis and the insignificant ALLL differences between public 
and private banks during the rest of the sample period.  
My interpretation of the results implies that bank regulators are unwilling to cater to 
banks’ private interests during the financial crisis, or when the regulatory emphasis is 
strong, such as the period from 2002 to 2007. However, when the economic environment 
is good and the regulatory emphasis is weak, such as the period between 2013 and 2015, 
bank regulators are willing to cater to banks’ private interests. The ALLL underestimations 
by state-chartered public banks between 2013 and 2015 represent about 13% of their 
annually reported ALLL. Absent income taxes, the ALLL underestimations inflate the 
reported earnings of state-chartered public banks by 5.8%-8.5% per year and their reported 
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equity capital by 0.8%-1.2% per year. But the ALLL underestimations only increase the 
Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio by 0.1%-0.2% per year. These calculations suggest that bank 
regulators allow state-chartered public banks to underestimate the ALLL between 2013 
and 2015 to report higher earnings, and to a lesser extent, higher equity capital. But the 
allowed reporting discretion is not to inflate the banks’ regulatory capital adequacy. 
The research design of this study invokes a crucial assumption that therer are no 
unobservable confounders to bias the results. Given that the set of covariates balanced in 
the study is comprehensive and closely tied to the ALLL estimation process in the 
regulatory guidance, any unobservable confounders very likely contain parallel 
information to the 55 covariates. Once the 55 covariates are balanced, the unobservable 
confounders are no longer a threat to the internal validity. As demonstrated in the 
sensitivity analysis, once current-year loan loss rates are balanced, including the loan loss 
information beyond the current year does not change the inference. Although the 
assumption cannot be tested directly, it is reasonable to doubt the existence of such 
unobservable confounders that can meaningfully alter the inference.  
 This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it provides direct 
evidence for whether bank supervision is effective—a question the literature does not 
adequately address. Agarwal et al. (2014) find that federal and state regulators are 
inconsistent in rating state-chartered banks under the CAMELS rating system. But 
inconsistency in assigning ratings cannot serve as conclusive evidence that bank 
supervision is ineffective, for two reasons. First, the rules governing the CAMELS ratings 
are not directed toward regulating banks’ behaviors. These rules are at most incomplete 
representations of bank regulations. Second, because state and federal regulators assign 
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different ratings after observing the same information reported by banks, the reporting 
outcomes may not be compromised during the supervisory processes. This paper studies a 
supervisory target that directly governs the reporting behaviors of banks and is central to 
the safety and soundness of the banking system. The results provide direct inference on 
whether bank supervision is effective. In fact, despite the imperfections of the institutional 
design of bank supervision, during the majority of the sample period examined and 
especially during the recent financial crisis, bank supervision of the ALLL estimations does 
not appear to have been ineffective. But this study confirms the finding in Agarwal et al. 
(2014) that the federal-state alternate supervision scheme can lead to lax enforcement of 
written banking rules. 
 Second, existing literature on bank supervision often implicitly assumes that 
supervisory laxity is constant over time, with the exception of Costello et al. (2016), who 
explore the time-varying relation between supervisory strictness and accounting 
restatements. This paper documents the heterogeneity in supervisory laxity under various 
economic and regulatory environments. Bank regulators, especially local bank regulators, 
are willing to cater to banks’ private interests when the economic environment is good and 
the regulatory emphasis is weak, but not during the financial crisis. This insight is 
consistent with a number of observations in which banks claim that the reason to switch 
from federal charters to state charters post crisis is that local regulators understand their 
business environments better. It also raises the doubt whether bank regulators exercised 
regulatory forbearance during the recent financial crisis. 
 Finally, this paper introduces a new method for modeling banks’ provisioning 
decisions. When examining loan loss provisioning-related questions, the literature often 
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uses the provision for loan and lease losses (PLLL) as the dependent variable, coupled with 
a small number of covariates to fit an OLS model (see Beatty and Liao (2014) for a review 
of the literature). The OLS approach has two major shortcomings. First, the PLLL is not a 
regulatory target, but rather a means to bring the ALLL to a level the bank examiners deem 
appropriate. In practice, the level of the ALLL is the focus of bank regulators in 
determining whether banks underprovisioned or overprovisioned for loan losses. 
Inferences about banks’ provisioning decisions should be made from the level of the ALLL, 
rather than the level of the PLLL. Second, as demonstrated in Armstrong et al. (2010) via 
propensity score matching, controlling a small number of covariates in an OLS model is 
inadequate to remove bias in observational studies. Likely due to these two shortcomings, 
the literature gives conflicting results regarding whether public or private banks are more 
timely to provision for loan losses (Nichols et al. 2009; Olszak et al. 2016). This study 
finds that public and private banks report almost the same level of the ALLL between 2002 
and 2012 after balancing 55 covariates with a weighting method that is more effective than 
propensity score matching in removing bias. The finding suggests that public banks 
provision neither more nor less timely than private banks. Future research on banks’ 
provisioning decisions can utilize and refine the method used in this paper for better 
inference.     
 
2 Predictions 
 The current accounting standards require an “incurred loss” model to estimate the 
ALLL; the ALLL must reflect loan losses that have probably occurred as of the evaluation 
date. Under this model, the ALLL is high when banks have trouble collecting principal and 
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interest payments from borrowers, usually during economic downturns, whereas the ALLL 
is low when banks have few problems collecting loan payments, usually during credit 
expansions.  
The ALLL is funded by reducing banks’ current-period earnings via the PLLL, an 
expense account that immediately follows the net interest income on banks’ income 
statements. As a result, the impact of loan loss provisioning on banks’ earnings is pro-
cyclical and amplifies the cyclicality of bank profits. During credit expansions, bank profits 
are high and the allocation of net interest income to the ALLL is low. The average PLLL 
can be as low as 5% of a bank’s net interest income. However, during economic downturns, 
when bank profits are already low, banks have to set aside more net interest income to fund 
increased ALLL. The ratio of the PLLL to net interest income can go over 30%, dragging 
banks’ earnings into the negative territory.  
Because the impact of loan loss provisioning on banks’ earnings amplifies the 
cyclicality of bank profits, banks have incentives to overestimate the ALLL to book 
“cookie jar reserves” to smooth earnings when profits are high (Kanagaretnam et al. 2004; 
Liu and Ryan 2006). But when banks are financially weak, they are incentivized to 
underprovision to preserve earnings and mitigate the negative impact of reduced earnings 
on equity capital (Huizinga and Laeven 2012).  
These incentives can be intensified among public banks. Public entities face more 
short-term profit pressure than private entities and focus more on periodic performance 
measures (Narayanan 1985; Stein 1989; Shleifer and Vishny 1990; Bushee 1998; Asker et 
al. 2015). As a result, when bank profits are high, public banks are more incentivized than 
private banks to overestimate the ALLL to smooth earnings (Balla and Rose 2015). But 
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when facing profit declines, public banks are more incentivized to underprovision (Beatty 
et al. 2002). Because banks’ incentives drive their incompliant reporting behaviors, the 
different intensity of incentives to misreport the ALLL between public and private banks 
forms a testing ground for effective bank supervision. If supervisory laxity is present, 
public banks will overestimate the ALLL relative to their private counterfactuals when both 
are financially strong, whereas public banks will underestimate the ALLL relative to their 
private counterfactuals when both are financially weak. If bank supervision is effective, no 
ALLL differences will exist between the two types of banks at any time.  
I examine bank supervision of the ALLL estimations over a sample period from 2002 
to 2015, during which economic environments differ. To show how bank profits vary 
during the period, I plot banks’ ROA and ROE in Figure 1. Between 2002 and 2007, bank 
profits were high. During the crisis period between 2008 and 2009, bank profits, especially 
profits of public banks, experienced steep declines.  
After the crisis, although the profits of both public and private banks recovered from 
historical lows, they are still under pressure. Banks’ ROA and ROE have remained stable 
since 2013, but they have not reached the pre-crisis levels. Compared to the early 2000s, 
when banks came out of the “tech bubble” unscathed, banks today face rising regulatory 
compliance costs and a prolonged near-zero interest rate environment. Both factors slow 
banks’ profit growth. For example, post crisis, the net interest margins of both public and 
private banks, shown in Figure 1, continued their downward trajectory, and in 2015, 
reached their lowest points in 14 years. The growth of total loans during this period, also 
shown in Figure 1, was tepid. Low margins and slow loan growth exacerbate banks’ 
difficulties making a profit.  
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Unlike the period from 2008 to 2015, the period from 2002 to 2007 is associated with 
a strong regulatory emphasis on compliant ALLL estimations. Between 2001 and 2007, 
three policy statements on compliant ALLL estimations were issued. The strong regulatory 
emphasis on the ALLL estimations during this period is due to the SEC’s concern that 
public banks overestimated the ALLL to book “cookie jar reserves” to smooth earnings. In 
1998, as a warning signal to all banks, the SEC publicly ordered the IPO-pending SunTrust 
Bank to restate its past three years’ ALLL by a total reduction of $100 million. In 2001, 
the securities regulator issued the Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 102 Selected Loan Loss 
Allowance Methodology and Documentation Issues (SAB 102), requiring all banks to 
estimate the ALLL in accordance with GAAP and properly document supporting 
methodologies. The SEC’s stance was endorsed by all bank regulators, which in the same 
year issued the Policy Statement on Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses Methodologies 
and Documentation for Banks and Savings Institutions (2001 Policy Statement). In 2006, 
the bank regulators again issued the Interagency Policy Statement on the Allowance for 
Loan and Lease Losses (2006 Interagency Statement), reiterating the “key concepts and 
requirements included in GAAP and existing ALLL supervisory guidance.”  
Based on my predictions of the relation between bank profitability and public banks’ 
incentives to misreport the ALLL, under lax supervision, public banks would overestimate 
the ALLL relative to their private counterfactuals between 2002 and 2007, despite the 
strong regulatory emphasis on compliant ALLL estimations during the period. But public 
banks would underestimate the ALLL relative to their private counterfactuals between 
2008 and 2015. If bank supervision of the ALLL estimations is effective, we should 
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observe no ALLL differences between these two types of banks over the entire sample 
period. 
Unlike private banks, the ALLL estimations of public banks are also subject to audit. 
But this difference between public and private banks does not change the validity of the 
inference from the predictions above with regard to whether bank supervision is effective. 
Bank regulators supervise the ALLL estimations of both public and private banks. 
Therefore, as long as the estimations differ between public banks and their private 
counterfactuals, bank regulators do not consistently enforce across the banks the regulation 
that governs the ALLL estimations. Whether bank supervision is effective is in question.  
 
3 Method 
This section discusses the method for estimating the effect of reporting incentives 
due to public listing on the ALLL estimations to infer whether bank supervision is effective 
in achieving consistent ALLL reporting between public and private banks. The effect is 
estimated by sample year. Section 3.1 discusses the selection of public and private banks 
for the sample. Section 3.2 briefly reviews the regulatory guidance on the ALLL 
estimations. The guidance forms the basis for identifying and constructing covariates that 
confound the effect estimation. Covariate construction is detailed in section 3.3. Section 
3.4 discusses the statistical approach to creating the pseudo-population of public and 
private banks from which the unbiased effect can be estimated.     
3.1 Sample Selection 
 I use bank data reported as of December 31 of each calendar year from 2002 to 2015 
to construct the sample. Bank data come from two sources: the Bank Regulatory database 
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of Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) for the years 2002 – 2013 and the FFIEC 
Central Data Repository’s Public Data Distribution website for years 2014 and 2015.  
 A typical banking organization in the United States is structured as a bank holding 
company (BHC), a corporation that owns one or more commercial banks (hereafter 
“banks”) and other non-banking subsidiaries. Amendments to the BHC Act in 1999 allow 
a BHC to declare itself a financial holding company (FHC) to engage in financial activities, 
such as securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting and agency activities, 
and merchant banking.  
Banks are supervised by one of the three regulatory agencies. The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC”) supervises national banks that are federally 
chartered; the Federal Reserve Board (the “Fed”) supervises state-chartered banks that are 
members of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the 
“FDIC”) supervises state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve 
System. The holding parent of a bank, either a BHC or an FHC, is supervised by the Fed.  
To minimize observable and unobservable differences between public and private 
banks, I impose the following criteria on the sample selection: (1) every bank selected to 
the sample is a national bank, a state member bank, or a state nonmember bank and is held 
by a BHC or an FHC, (2) both the bank and its holding parent are headquartered in the 
continental United States, and (3) neither the bank nor its holding parent is owned by any 
foreign entity or person. 
 A bank is “public” if either the bank itself or its holding parent is listed on one of the 
three major exchanges, i.e., the NYSE, the AMEX, or the NASDAQ. I identify public 
banks in the sample using the CRSP-FRB link table (2014-3), which is available on the 
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website of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The table lists the majority of the banks 
or their holding parents that were once listed on one of the three major exchanges between 
January 1, 1990 and March 31, 2014. I use the CRSP Daily Stock File of WRDS to obtain 
the start and end dates of the listings up to December 31, 2015, the last day of the sample 
period.  
I delete the bank-year observations of a public bank before the start date and after 
the end date of its listing from the sample, for two reasons. First, many banks are traded on 
an OTC market before being listed on a major exchange, and almost all banks are moved 
to an OTC market after a delisting event. An OTC-listing is distinct from both “being public” 
and “being private” (Bushee and Leuz 2005). Such bank-year observations are not suitable 
to be considered either public or private. Second, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) show that 
prior to a public listing, private non-financial firms start to adjust their financial reporting 
to resemble that of public firms as early as three years before their IPOs. Banks that 
consider an IPO may do the same. Given that the exact dates when banks contemplate 
going public are unknown, considering such pre-IPO bank-year observations either public 
or private is not appropriate. 
 For banks that do not have a match in the CRSP-FRB link table, I search SNL 
Financials to identify omitted public listings and code the remaining banks “private” if I 
cannot find a trading history on any OTC market. A few banks have holding parents that 
are themselves subsidiaries of a BHC or an FHC. If the higher holders are publicly listed, 
the banks held underneath are coded “public”.    
3.2 The Regulatory Guidance on the ALLL Estimations  
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Estimating the ALLL is essentially estimating loan losses (impairments) that have 
probably occurred as of the evaluation date. The ALLL has two major components: loan 
losses estimated under ASC 310-10-35 (FAS 114) and loan losses estimated under ASC 
450-20 (FAS 5).3 Figure 2 illustrates the steps a bank must follow to estimate loan losses. 
The first step is to classify each loan into the FAS 114 pool and the FAS 5 pool, based on 
whether the loan is considered impaired. Loans in the FAS 114 pool are evaluated 
individually for impairments, using one of the three valuation methods: fair value of the 
collateral if the loan is collateral-dependent, present value of expected future cash flows, 
or the loan’s observable market price. Which method to use is at the banks’ discretion. 
 Loans that are not considered impaired are evaluated under FAS 5. Loan losses 
estimated under FAS 5 often constitute the largest component of the ALLL. The evaluation 
follows three steps: (1) segmenting the loan pool into different loan categories based on 
common risk characteristics, (2) estimating the adjusted historical loan loss rate (net 
charge-off rate) for each loan category, and (3) applying the estimated loan loss rate to 
estimate loan losses. The regulatory guidance does not prescribe how to segment the loan 
pool and how to estimate the adjusted historical loan loss rate. Banks determine how to do 
so, based on the complexity of the banks’ lending activities and the capability of the banks’ 
information systems.  
The historical loan loss rate is estimated from historical net charge-offs. To determine 
the historical net charge-offs relevant to the loan loss rate estimation, banks either take a 
simple average of the net charge-offs over a period of time in the past or use a more 
complex migration analysis assigning more weights to more recent net charge-offs. 
                                                          
3 A small component of the ALLL is estimated under ASC 310-30 (SOP 03-3), Accounting for Certain Loans 
or Debt Securities Acquired in a Transfer. 
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Because the loan portfolio condition when historical loan losses occurred may differ from 
the loan portfolio condition at the date of the evaluation, the historical loan loss rate must 
adjust for environmental factors that are relevant to the current condition of the loan 
portfolio before being applied to estimate loan losses. The environmental factors can 
include the following: volume and changes in volume of past due and nonaccrual loans; 
changes in volume and types of loans; changes in lending policies and procedures; changes 
in experience, ability, and depth of lending staff and management; and changes in local 
and national economic and business conditions (2001 Policy Statement; 2006 Interagency 
Statement). 
The ALLL covers estimated losses within all loans held for investment, but does not 
cover estimated losses within loans carried at fair value, loans held for sale, off-balance 
sheet credit exposures, or general business risks.    
3.3 Covariate Construction 
 The raw ALLL differences between public and private banks cannot provide 
unbiased effects of reporting incentives due to public listing on the ALLL estimations, 
because they are confounded by loan portfolio and institutional characteristics, which are 
associated with both the ALLL estimations and the banks’ listing status. First, based on the 
regulatory guidance, the ALLL estimations are determined by the characteristics of the 
banks’ loan portfolios and institutional factors, such as the complexity of the banks’ 
lending activities and the capability of the banks’ management, lending staff, and 
information systems. Second, the same loan portfolio and institutional characteristics are 
also associated with the banks’ public listing status. A major factor that influences a bank’s 
decision to go public is access to the equity market to fund expansions of their lending 
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businesses. Banks that opt for an IPO also have the capability to carry out such endeavors. 
Over time, with an objective to pursue faster growth, public banks not only build loan 
portfolios vastly different from the loan portfolios of private banks, but they also become 
more sophisticated institutions.  
To adequately control for confounding, these loan portfolio and institutional 
characteristic differences must be balanced between public and private banks. Moreover, 
the covariates to capture these characteristic differences must closely tie to the ALLL 
estimations. To an academic researcher who does not have access to individual loan 
impairment data, estimating the ALLL is no different from estimating probable loan losses 
by banks for the FAS 5 loan pool, of which banks also cannot observe the loan losses. I 
follow the FAS 5 estimation steps to identify and construct 55 covariates that capture these 
loan portfolio and institutional differences between public and private banks. This 
approach does not consider the factors that influence the loss estimations of the FAS 114 
loans. But because the FAS 114 factors are specific to individual loans, they are likely 
idiosyncratic in nature and do not contribute to systematic ALLL differences between 
public and private banks. Therefore, ignoring these factors is not likely to introduce bias in 
the effect estimation.     
3.3.1 Covariates that Reflect Loan Portfolio Characteristics 
According to FAS 5, the first step in estimating loan losses is to segment the loan 
pool into different loan categories based on common risk characteristics. Following this 
approach, I segment the loan portfolios of the banks in the sample into the following six 
categories: residential real estate loans, commercial real estate loans, commercial & 
industrial loans, consumer loans, loans secured by farmland, and agricultural loans. 
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These loan categories expose banks to significant credit risks, and the risk exposures 
are statistically different between public and private banks. To illustrate this point, I list all 
loan categories reported by banks in the Call Report filings in Figure 1 and compare the 
average concentration of credit of each loan category between public and private banks 
over the sample period. I calculate a concentration of credit by dividing the amount of loans 
in each category by the sum of Tier 1 risk-based capital and the ALLL. This formula for 
calculating the concentration of credit is taken from the Comptrollers Handbook 
(December 2011) of the OCC.  
The OCC considers a concentration of credit exceeding 0.25 a material exposure to 
credit risks. For both public and private banks, the concentrations of credit of residential 
real estate loans (real estate loans secured by 1-4 family residential properties), commercial 
real estate loans (real estate loans secured by commercial properties), commercial & 
industrial loans, and consumer loans all exceed 0.25. The p-values from the Kruskal-Wallis 
Rank Sum Test4 and the SMDs both suggest that the differences in the concentrations of 
credit of these loans are statistically significant between public and private banks. Unlike 
private banks, public banks engage in less agriculture-related lending. For public banks, 
the concentrations of credit of real estate loans secured by farmland and agricultural loans 
are below 0.25, but for private banks, these concentrations of credit are often above 0.5.  
For the rest of the loan categories held by both public and private banks, such as 
municipal loans, loans to depository institutions, loans to foreign government, other loans, 
and lease financing receivables, the concentrations of credit are small. Many of these loan 
                                                          
4 The null hypothesis of the test is that the two comparison groups originate from the same distribution. 
Unlike the t-test, the Kruskal-Wallis test is non-parametric and does not assume normal distributions. 
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categories do not exhibit statistically significant differences between public and private 
banks. Therefore, I do not consider these loan categories when constructing the covariates. 
 Based on the regulatory guidance, the second step in the ALLL estimation under 
FAS 5 is to estimate the adjusted historical loan loss rate for each loan category. Loan loss 
rates are estimated from historical net charge-offs and are adjusted for environmental 
factors. First, I construct the covariate “current-year loan loss rate” for each loan category 
using current-year net charge-offs of each loan category divided by total loans. Using 
average 12-month net charge-offs over the past 12 to 36 months is common among banks 
in estimating loan loss rates. In the sensitivity analysis, I show that including information 
from the prior-year net charge-offs does not change the inference.  
Next, I construct covariates to capture the environmental factors related to loan 
portfolio characteristics when adjusting the historical loan loss rates. These environmental 
factors include the volume of loans, the change in the volume of loans, and the volume and 
the change in the volume of problem loans. I measure the volume of loans and the change 
in the volume of loans of each loan category by its concentration of credit and its year-
over-year growth, respectively. I follow the Call Report filings to categorize problem loans 
into three likelihoods of default: past due 30-89 days and still accruing principal and 
interest payments, past due 90 or more days and still accruing principal and interest 
payments, and in nonaccrual status. I measure the volume of problem loans by dividing the 
amount of problem loans in each loan category by the amount of total loans. The reason to 
use total loans as the scaler is that the ALLL is reported at the total loan level. The impact 
of problem loans in each loan category on the ALLL estimations should consider their 
proportional relevance to the entire loan portfolio. Because zero values appear often when 
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individual banks report problem loans in each loan category, I calculate the change in the 
volume of problem loans as the year-over-year growth of problem loans at the total loan 
level to preserve the sample size. A total of 39 covariates are constructed to reflect the 
banks’ loan portfolio characteristics. They are listed in Appendix A-I.  
3.3.2 Covariates that Reflect Institutional Characteristics   
 In this section, I discuss covariate construction to capture the environmental factors 
associated with institutional characteristics of the banks, such as the capability of the banks’ 
management, lending staff, and information systems. A common covariate that reflects 
banks’ institutional characteristics is the size of the bank. Bank size is measured as the log 
of total assets. Banks can be held by either an FHC or a BHC. Because an FHC engages in 
more complex financial activities and must meet more stringent performance criteria, I use 
an indicator variable TYPE to differentiate banks held by FHCs from banks held by BHCs. 
I construct the rest of the covariates to be closely related to the CAMELS rating 
system, following the variable definitions in Bassett et al. (2015), Falato and Scharfstein 
(2016), and the Uniform Bank Performance Report. The CAMELS rating system is the 
only uniform rating system to evaluate a bank’s managerial, operational, financial, and 
compliance performance. The CAMELS ratings consist of six components: capital 
adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management capability (M), earnings quantity and quality 
(E), the adequacy of liquidity (L), and sensitivity to market risk (S). Appendix A-II lists 
and defines the covariates constructed under each of the six components. The covariates 
that reflect loan portfolio characteristics also reflect the “asset quality” of the banks, so 
only one covariate is included under “asset quality”. A total of 16 covariates are constructed 
to reflect the banks’ institutional characteristics. 
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3.4 Weighting to Estimate the Unbiased Effect 
 When modeling banks’ provisioning decisions, the current literature often uses an 
OLS model with the PLLL as the dependent variable and a few covariates as control 
variables (see Beatty and Liao (2014) for a literature review). Two shortcomings prevent 
this approach from yielding reliable inference. First, the level of the ALLL, rather than the 
level of the PLLL, determines whether a bank adequately provisioned for its loan losses 
and should be the outcome variable for approaching loan loss provisioning-related 
empirical problems. The PLLL is only a derivative of the ALLL estimations. Its sole 
purpose is to bring the ALLL to an appropriate level to cover estimated loan losses. In fact, 
according to bank supervisory manuals, the PLLL is not a supervisory target, and the level 
of the ALLL is the focus in bank examinations.  
Moreover, using the PLLL as the outcome variable assumes that the ALLL has a 
constant baseline level and the net charge-offs have a one-to-one relation to the PLLL. This 
assumption is not always correct. Consider a bank that experiences an increase in estimated 
losses in the loan portfolio during the current evaluation period. If the net charge-offs 
neither increase nor decrease from the last evaluation period, more losses should be 
provisioned to bring the ALLL to a higher level. However, if the net charge-offs decrease 
from the last evaluation period, the ALLL can be enough to cover the increased loss 
estimate, and zero loss should be provisioned during the current period. Throughout this 
study, the outcome variable is the ALLL scaled by total loans, as in Beck and 
Narayanamoorthy (2013). 
 The second shortcoming of the OLS approach is that the success of an OLS model 
in removing bias depends on the validity of two assumptions: first, that the comparison 
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groups share the same distributions in the covariates, and second, that not only is the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the covariates linear, but also that the 
linear relationship is the same between the comparison groups. These assumptions are often 
too stringent to be satisfied using observational data, causing effects estimated under an 
OLS model to be model-dependent. 
 Instead of imposing model assumptions on the data, I use a matching method for this 
study. The advantage of a matching method over the OLS approach is that the former 
mimics a randomized experiment to separate the stages of design and outcome analysis. In 
the design stage, comparison groups are balanced over covariates that likely contribute bias 
to the effect estimation. Under the conditional independence assumption, once the 
covariates are balanced, the outcomes of comparison groups no longer depend on the 
treatment assignment, just like the outcomes of comparison groups do not depend on the 
treatment assignment in a randomized experiment. In the outcome analysis stage, the effect 
can be estimated by simply calculating the difference in group means.  
 A common matching method is matching on the propensity score—the probability 
of receiving the treatment conditional on the covariates. A disadvantage of propensity score 
matching is that it often does not use all the data in the sample. In a typical one-to-one 
matching without replacement, observations in one of the comparison groups without a 
match in the other are dropped from the sample, reducing the estimation precision and the 
external validity. K-to-one matching or matching with replacement can keep more data in 
the matched sample. But the former can introduce bias in the effect estimation, whereas 
the latter makes inference more complicated, because units selected from one of the 
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comparison groups are likely sampled multiple times and are no longer independent of 
each other in the matched sample (Stuart 2010). 
 Because private banks outnumber public banks in my sample, I use a weighting 
method developed by Li and Greene (2013) to circumvent the disadvantage of propensity 
score matching. The weighting method is analogous to one-to-one without-replacement 
propensity score matching, but uses all the data in the sample. In their simulation study, Li 
and Greene (2013) demonstrate that the weighting method achieves better balance and 
more efficient estimation than propensity score matching.    
 The first step of the weighting method, as in propensity score matching, is to estimate 
the propensity scores. I run the following logistic regression for each sample year to 
estimate the propensity scores:  Log � Pr (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖=1)
1−Pr (𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖=1)� = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊. 
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 is the “Public” dummy. 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 1 if bank 𝑖𝑖 is public; 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 0 if bank 𝑖𝑖 is private.  𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 indexes 
the state where bank 𝑖𝑖 is physically headquartered. Because the environmental factors for 
adjusting the historical loan loss rates take into account regional economic conditions, 
adding the state indicator controls for all observable and unobservable economic and 
business environmental differences across states. 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊  is a vector containing the 55 
covariates of bank 𝑖𝑖. 
 Two general concerns exist regarding the propensity score estimation. First, the 
estimation model may be misspecified. This concern, however, is not an issue if the 55 
covariates are balanced between public and private banks. Once such balance is achieved, 
the estimated propensity scores are consistent estimators of the true propensity scores (Ho 
et al. 2007).  
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The second concern is that some unobservable confounders continue to contribute 
bias in the estimation. However, the unobservable confounders can only contribute bias to 
the effect estimation when they are both related to the ALLL estimations and orthogonal 
to the 55 covariates. Otherwise, if the unobservable confounders are correlated with one or 
more covariates, once the 55 covariates are balanced, the unobservable confounders are 
also balanced. Given that this study uses a large set of covariates to estimate the propensity 
scores and the covariates are constructed around the key inputs of the ALLL estimation 
process, the unobservable confounders likely contain parallel information to the 55 
covariates and therefore, are not threats to the internal validity. I demonstrate in the 
sensitivity analysis that the 55 covariates can indeed balance omitted variables that contain 
parallel information to the 55 covariates. 
 The second step of the weighting method is to calculate the “matching weight” (Li 
and Greene 2013) assigned to each observation based on the estimated propensity score. 
The following is the formula for calculating the matching weight for bank 𝑖𝑖: min (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, 1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + (1 − 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)(1 − 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖), 
where 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 denotes the estimated propensity score of bank 𝑖𝑖. The matching weight closely 
resembles the weight used in the inverse probability of treatment weighting (IPTW). They 
share the same denominator, but the matching weight replaces the numerator “1” in the 
IPTW weight with min(𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , 1 – 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖). As a result, unlike IPTW, which often suffers from 
extreme propensity score values, this weighting method assigns smaller weights to 
observations with extremely large and small propensity scores (when 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 equals 0 or 1, the 
observation receives zero weight).   
 The final step is to run a matching weight-weighted regression: 
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𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝜇𝜇1𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒1𝑖𝑖. 
𝜇𝜇1  is the estimated effect of reporting incentives due to public listing on the ALLL 
estimations. If the 55 covariates are balanced between public and private banks, the above 
regression will give the unbiased effect estimate under the conditional independence 
assumption.  
I also run a longer version of the above regression, controlling for all 55 covariates 
used in the propensity score estimation model and with the state fixed effects: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇2𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊 + 𝑒𝑒2𝑖𝑖. 
If the covariates are balanced between public and private banks, adding covariates and 
fixed effects to the regression will not alter the size of the estimated effect from the shorter 
regression, i.e., 𝜇𝜇1  = 𝜇𝜇2 , but may yield a smaller standard error on 𝜇𝜇2 . If 𝜇𝜇1  = 𝜇𝜇2 , the 
estimated effect is indeed unbiased under the conditional independence assumption.  
 
4 Results5  
4.1 Check Balance 
 Before moving to the outcome analysis stage to estimate the effect, we need to make 
sure that the estimated propensity scores can balance the 55 covariates between public and 
private banks. To test whether the state fixed effects in the propensity score estimation 
model can balance the differences of economic conditions between states where the public 
                                                          
5 Data analysis is conducted in R (R Core Team 2016) and uses the following R packages: “data.table” 
(Dowle et al. 2015), “dplyr” (Wickham and Francois 2016), “ggplot2” (Wickham 2009), “glm2” (Marschner 
2014), “lmtest” (Zeileis and Hothorn 2012), “Matching” (Sekhon 2011), “multcomp” (Hothorn et al. 2008), 
“multiwayvcov” (Graham et al. 2016), “reshape2” (Wickham 2007), “survey” (Lumley 2016, 2004), and 
“tableone” (Yoshida and Bohn 2015).   
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and private banks are located, I also check the balances of three economic indicators: the 
state unemployment rate (UNST), the state GDP growth (GDPST), and the state year-over-
year change in the value of housing permits (PMST). I obtain these economic indicators 
from the websites of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and 
the Census Bureau, respectively.  
I use the SMDs to check balances of the 58 covariates between public and private 
banks. The SMDs are preferred to the p-values from a statistical test of hypothesis to infer 
whether covariates between comparison groups are balanced, because the SMDs are 
calculated independent of the sample size (Austin and Stuart 2015). If the sample size is 
reduced during the design stage, the p-values from a hypothesis test can be inflated simply 
because of a loss of statistical power.  
I graph the SMDs of the 58 covariates of the unmatched and the weighted samples 
by sample year in Figure 2. To compare the balancing capability of the weighting method 
with that of propensity score matching, I also graph the SMDs from a matched sample after 
applying one-to-one without-replacement matching on the logit of the propensity score, 
with a caliper of width equal to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of the propensity 
score. In simulation studies, this particular propensity score matching method estimates the 
treatment effect with smaller bias and mean squared error than optimal and nearest 
neighbor matching (Austin 2014). The propensity scores used in the matching method are 
the same as the ones used in the weighting method. 
Covariates are listed in each graph in the descending order of the magnitude of the 
SMDs of the unmatched sample. In each graph, the red line plots the SMDs of the 
unmatched sample, the green line plots the SMDs of the matched sample, and the blue line 
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plots the SMDs of the weighted sample. SMD = 0.1 is noted in all graphs as a solid straight 
line to the right of 0.0. An SMD < 0.1 usually suggests that the covariate is balanced 
between the comparison groups, whereas an SMD > 0.1 often suggests that the covariate 
is not balanced and may contribute bias to the effect estimation. 
The rank order of the magnitude of the SMDs among covariates in the unmatched 
samples varies from year to year, but bank size (SIZE) remains the covariate with the 
largest imbalance between public and private banks across all years. Imbalances of entity 
type (TYPE) and concentrations of credit of agricultural loans (AG.CON), real estate loans 
secured by farmland (FARM.CON), and commercial real estate loans (CRE.CON) are also 
frequently among the top five largest. 
The graphs clearly show that the weighting method achieves better balances among 
covariates than propensity score matching in all years. All SMDs under the weighting 
method, including the SMDs of the three economic indicators, are smaller than 0.1. In fact, 
across all years and all covariates, the maximum SMD under the weighting method is 0.067, 
whereas the maximum SMD under the propensity score matching is 0.267. In addition, the 
propensity score matching often causes the SMDs of several covariates that are balanced 
in the unmatched samples to exceed 0.1 after matching.  
4.2 Baseline Results  
 Table 2 presents the estimated effects of reporting incentives due to public listing on 
the ALLL estimations. The effects are reported under “Public” and are estimated under 
three methods: (1) an OLS model with the 55 covariates as control variables and the state 
fixed effects, (2) a matching-weight weighted regression without any control variables or 
the state fixed effects, and (3) a matching-weight weighted regression with the 55 
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covariates as control variables and the state fixed effects. All standard errors are in 
parentheses and are clustered at the state level. The effects estimated under the third method 
are the baseline results.   
 A side-by-side comparison of the effects estimated under the two weighting methods 
shows that either the coefficients on “Public” under both methods are identical or the 
discrepancy is no larger than 0.0003 across all years. It suggests that the weighting method 
is successful in removing the bias captured by the 55 covariates and the state indicator 
variable in the propensity score estimation model. A side-by-side comparison of the effects 
estimated under the weighting method with a weighted regression with controls and the 
state fixed effects and the OLS model shows that although the signs of the coefficients are 
almost identical in all years under both the weighting method and the OLS model, the effect 
estimates from the OLS model are often larger. The OLS approach likely continues to give 
biased effect estimates.  
  Based on the predictions discussed in section 2, if bank supervision of the ALLL 
estimations was effective, public and private banks in the weighted sample would report 
the same level of the ALLL throughout the entire sample period. If bank supervision of the 
ALLL estimations was lax, public banks would overestimate the ALLL relative to private 
banks between 2002 and 2007, when bank profitability was high. But public banks would 
underestimate the ALLL between 2008 and 2015, when bank profitability was under 
pressure.  
The baseline results suggest that bank supervision of the ALLL estimations was 
effective between 2002 and 2007. During this period, public banks only overestimate the 
ALLL between 2002 and 2005. The overestimations range from $0.0004 to $0.0006 per 
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dollar of total loans. Based on the average total loans held by public banks during the period, 
these ALLL overestimations are small in economic magnitude; they represent 2.1%-4.1% 
of reported ALLL. In 2006 and 2007, the ALLL estimations do not differ between public 
and private banks. These results can be explained by the strong regulatory emphasis on 
compliant ALLL estimations during this period. After the issuance of the SAB 102 and the 
2001 Policy Statement, public banks constrained their behaviors to smooth earnings (Balla 
and Rose 2015). The disappearance of the ALLL differences between public and private 
banks in 2006 and 2007 also coincides with the issuance of the 2006 Interagency Statement.  
The results between 2008 and 2015 suggest that bank supervision was effective 
during the crisis and the short period afterward, but became lax in the last three years of 
the sample period. In 2008, the ALLL difference between public and private banks is zero, 
and in 2009, public banks overestimate the ALLL by $0.0010 per dollar of total loans. 
From 2010 to 2012, public and private banks report the same level of the ALLL. However, 
between 2013 and 2015, public banks underestimate the ALLL by $0.0016, $0.0015, and 
$0.0013 per dollar of total loans, respectively. These ALLL underestimations are both 
statistically and economically significant. The average total loans of public banks in 2013, 
2014, and 2015 are $13.42 billion, $14.24 billion, and $18.22 billion, respectively, which 
convert the per-dollar-of-total-loan ALLL underestimations in these three years to 
respective dollar amounts of $21.47 million, $21.37 million, and $23.68 million. They 
account for about 9% of reported ALLL of public banks.    
4.3 Additional Tests for Supervisory Laxity  
 I conduct two additional tests to confirm that the observed ALLL differences 
between public and private banks, especially the differences in recent years, are due to lax 
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supervision. The tests are based on the finding in Agarwal et al. (2014) that state regulators 
are more lenient than federal regulators when assigning the CAMELS ratings to the same 
state-chartered banks, which are subject to the federal-state alternate supervision scheme. 
If the ALLL differences between public and private banks are due to supervisory laxity, 
we should observe more supervisory laxity, in terms of larger ALLL differences between 
public and private banks, between state-chartered public and private banks than between 
federally chartered public and private banks, which are subject to supervision from federal 
regulators only. We should also observe larger ALLL differences between state-chartered 
public and private banks located in more leniently supervised states than between state-
chartered public and private banks located in less leniently supervised states.  
To test the first prediction that the ALLL differences are larger between state-
chartered public and private banks, I interact the “Public” dummy with an indicator 
variable “State charter”, which equals “1” if the bank has a state charter and “0” if the bank 
has a federal charter. The results are reported in Table 3. The ALLL differences between 
federally chartered public and private banks are the coefficients on “Public”. The ALLL 
differences between state-chartered public and private banks are the combined coefficients 
of “Public” and “Public × State charter”. All standard errors are in parentheses and are 
clustered at the state level.  
 The ALLL differences between state-chartered public and private banks can almost 
entirely explain the ALLL differences estimated from the all-bank sample. Between 2002 
and 2004, only state-chartered public banks, but not federally chartered public banks, 
overestimate the ALLL. The overestimations remain small. Between 2013 and 2015, the 
ALLL underestimations of state-chartered public banks are larger than the 
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underestimations of public banks from the all-bank sample, the former averaging $0.0022, 
$0.0016, and $0.0015 per dollar of total loans in the respective three years. Federally 
chartered public banks do not underestimate the ALLL in 2013. In 2014 and 2015, federally 
chartered public banks only underestimate the ALLL by $0.0009 and $0.0007 per dollar of 
total loans, respectively. These results are consistent with the conclusion that bank 
supervision of the ALLL estimations has become lax in recent years.  
 To test the second prediction that the ALLL differences are larger betwee5n state-
chartered public and private banks located in more leniently supervised states than between 
state-chartered public and private banks located in less leniently supervised states, I split 
the sample of state-chartered banks into two subsamples. One subsample consists of state-
chartered banks located in states with an above-average state leniency index as computed 
in Agarwal et al. (2014), and the other consists of state-chartered banks located in states 
with an average or below-average state leniency index. The state leniency index, which is 
generously made available by Amit Seru, is the average spread between the CAMELS 
ratings assigned by the federal regulator and the ratings assigned by the state regulator to 
the same state-chartered banks in a given state. The higher the index value, the more 
differently state and federal regulators rate the same state-chartered banks in a given state. 
Because state regulators are found to assign more favorable ratings to the same state-
chartered banks than federal regulators, the higher the index value, the more lenient the 
state regulator in a given state.6 Table 4 reports the results of this test. 
 As predicted, larger ALLL differences appear between state-chartered public and 
private banks located in more leniently supervised states than between state-chartered 
                                                          
6 The index is computed up to the fourth quarter of 2010. But because the rating spreads are persistent over 
time, the state leniency index is still a good proxy for the post-2010 period of this study. 
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public and private banks located in less leniently supervised states. Between 2002 and 2005, 
state-chartered public banks located in more leniently supervised states overestimate the 
ALLL in 2003 and 2005 by $0.0010 and $0.0008 per dollar of total loans, respectively. 
During the same period, state-chartered public banks located in less leniently supervised 
states only overestimate the ALLL by $0.0004 per dollar of total loans in 2005. Between 
2013 and 2015, the ALLL underestimations are larger among state-chartered public banks 
located in more leniently supervised states than among state-chartered public banks located 
in less leniently supervised states. In addition, state-chartered public banks located in more 
leniently supervised states start to underestimate the ALLL in 2012, one year earlier than 
state-chartered public banks located in less leniently supervised states. These findings are 
again consistent with the conclusion that bank supervision has become lax recently. 
The above two tests also suggest that between 2006 and 2011, bank supervision of 
the ALLL estimations was effective. First, during this period, state-chartered public and 
private banks report the same level of the ALLL, suggesting little supervisory laxity. This 
conclusion is consistent with the conclusion from the all-bank sample. In 2006 and 2011, 
the ALLL estimations differ between state-chartered public and private banks located in 
more leniently supervised states. But because these differences do not have counterparts in 
the test of the federal-state split, I do not over-interpret their meanings.  
Second, because the ALLL overestimation by public banks in 2009 is not associated 
with state supervisory leniency, the overestimation is not likely due to public banks’ “big 
bath” reporting behavior, which also suggests ineffective bank supervision. In the federal-
state split, neither state-chartered public banks nor federally chartered public banks 
overestimate the ALLL relative to their private counterparts in 2009. In the split by the 
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state leniency index, state-chartered public banks located in more leniently supervised 
states do not overestimate the ALLL in 2009 either. In fact, it is the state-chartered public 
banks located in less leniently supervised states that overestimate the ALLL in 2009. 
Although I hesitate to interpret these results as evidence that less lenient bank regulators 
precautiously required public banks to overestimate the ALLL at the worst of the financial 
crisis, at least the results do not support the claim that public banks took a “big bath” 
approach toward the ALLL estimations during the crisis. In the next section, I further rule 
out the possibility of the existence of stock market discipline as an alternative explanation 
for the results.   
4.4 Tests for the Existence of Stock Market Discipline  
 Either voluntarily or as required by securities regulations, public entities 
communicate and disclose more to their shareholders and the investment community than 
private entities. Therefore, compared to private entities, public entities are subject to added 
scrutiny from stock market participants, and the scrutiny may help discipline their reporting 
behaviors (e.g., see studies by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) 
on non-financial firms).  
Because we do not have empirical evidence on whether the stock market can 
discipline banks’ reporting behaviors, I conduct three tests to find out whether stock market 
discipline exists and helps suppress public banks’ incentives to misreport the ALLL. 
Because institutional investors are generally believed to actively monitor the management 
of public entities, I use the following three proxies to capture the intensity of stock market 
discipline: the percentage of institutional ownership, the institutional ownership HHI, and 
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the number of institutional block owners. Data for the three proxies come from the database 
of Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings of WRDS.  
 The tests use the all-bank sample. I split the sample of public banks into two 
subsamples based on whether the banks have an above-average, or an average or below-
average proxy, and retain all private banks as the comparison group for both subsamples. 
If stock market discipline exists, during those misreporting years, we should observe 
smaller ALLL underestimations or overestimations among public banks with an above-
average proxy than we should among public banks with an average or below-average proxy. 
Table 5 reports the results.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results from the split by the percentage of institutional 
ownership. Between 2002 and 2005, public banks with an above-average percentage of 
institutional ownership overestimate the ALLL in 2002 and 2004 by $0.0007 and $0.0015 
per dollar of total loans, respectively. Public banks with an average or below-average 
percentage of institutional ownership only overestimate the ALLL in 2002 by $0.0003 per 
dollar of total loans. Public banks with an above-average percentage of institutional 
ownership starts to underestimate the ALLL in 2012, one year earlier than public banks 
with an average or below-average percentage of institutional ownership. In two out of the 
three years between 2013 and 2015, the ALLL underestimations by public banks with an 
above-average percentage of institutional ownership are larger than the underestimations 
by public banks with an average or below-average percentage of institutional ownership. 
For the rest of the sample period, public and private banks do not differ in the ALLL 
estimations in either subsample. Even if the results cannot conclude that higher institutional 
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ownership drives public banks to misreport the ALLL, they suggest that stock market 
discipline is absent in the context of ALLL estimations. 
Panels B and C of Table 5 present the results from the splits by the institutional 
ownership HHI and the number of institutional block owners, respectively. The results 
show that throughout the entire sample period and especially for the period between 2013 
and 2015, when bank supervision became lax, public banks subject to a higher intensity of 
institutional monitoring do not misreport the ALLL less than public banks subject to a 
lower intensity of institutional monitoring. The results again suggest that stock market 
discipline is absent regarding the ALLL estimations. The insignificant ALLL differences 
between public and private banks, especially during the financial crisis, are due to effective 
bank supervision.  
The stock market discipline hypothesis is a counter-argument to the underpinnning 
of the predictions raised by this study—the stock market creates pressure for banks to 
engage in misreporting. Therefore, the conclusion that stock market discipline is absent 
proves that the predictions of this study are well reasoned. 
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
 The validity of my results rests on a crucial assumption that no unobservable 
confounders exist to meaningfully bias the effect estimations. This assumption cannot be 
tested directly. But I argue that such confounders very likely do not exist, because the 55 
covariates balanced between public and private banks are comprehensive and capture the 
key inputs of the ALLL estimation process as outlined in the regulatory guidance. 
Unobservable confounders, which must also relate to the ALLL estimations, very likely 
contain parallel information to the 55 covariates. Therefore, once the 55 covariates are 
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balanced, the unobservable confounders can no longer contribute bias to the effect 
estimations. 
 I offer a demonstration of this argument. So far in this study, I have only used the 
current-year net charge-offs to calculate the historical loan loss rates. However, banks often 
use average net charge-offs of both the current year and the past few years to calculate the 
historical loan loss rates. Such loan loss rate calculation contains information about past 
loan losses that are not balanced in this study. But because the average net charge-offs 
correlate with the current-year net charge-offs, the historical loan loss rate calculated using 
only the current-year net charge-offs can balance the historical loan loss rate containing 
information about past loan losses.  
I calculate an alternative historical loan loss rate by averaging both the current-year 
and the prior-year net charge-offs, and use this alternative loan loss rate to re-estimate the 
ALLL differences between public and private banks, between federally chartered public 
and private banks, and between state-chartered public and private banks. The results are 
reported in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 6. The original estimates as reported in Table 
3 are presented in columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 6. The sizes of the estimated effects 
are fairly similar under the two different loan loss rate calculations. The inference from the 
original results still holds. 
4.6 Implications of the Overall Results 
 Table 7 presents the impact of the ALLL underestimations of state-chartered public 
banks between 2013 and 2015 on their reported earnings, equity capital, and Tier 1 risk-
based capital ratio. Columns (1) to (3) convert the per-dollar-of-total-loan ALLL 
underestimations to dollar amounts. In these three years, state-chartered public banks 
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underestimate the ALLL by $10.40 million, $8.35 million, and $8.84 million, respectively. 
The ALLL underestimations account for about 11.9%-14.4% of reported ALLL (reported 
in column (8)), 5.8%-8.5% of reported income before taxes and extraordinary items 
(reported in column (9)), and 0.8%-1.2% of reported equity capital (reported in column 
(10)). However, the ALLL underestimations account for only 0.1%-0.2% of total risk-
weighted assests (reported in column (11)), the maximum impact on Tier 1 risk-based 
capital ratio absent income taxes. These calculations suggest that bank regulators allow 
state-chartered public banks to underestimate the ALLL to report higher earnings, and to a 
lesser degree, equity capital. Because the impact on Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio is 
marginal, the allowed reporting discretion is not to inflate the banks’ regulatory capital 
adequacy.  
Overall, the results imply that bank regulators are unwilling to cater to banks’ private 
interests when the regulatory emphasis is strong—the ALLL overestimations at the 
beginning of the sample period are small. Bank regulators are also unwilling to cater to 
banks’ private interests during the financial crisis, because public banks do not 
underestimate the ALLL between 2008 and 2009. However, bank regulators are willing to 
cater to banks’ private interests when the economic environment is good and the regulatory 
emphasis is weak, such as the period between 2013 and 2015. During these three years, the 
proportions of problem loans held by banks almost reached the pre-crisis low levels (see 
Figure 4), but as discussed before, bank profits were still under pressure. Supervisory laxity 
is not a constant; it varies with changing economic and regulatory environments. 
  
5 Conclusion 
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 I study whether bank supervision is effective in enforcing the written regulation 
governing the estimations of the allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) consistently 
between public and private banks between 2002 and 2015. Based on prior literature, public 
banks are more incentivized than private banks to overestimate the ALLL when bank 
profitability is high, but public banks are more incentivized than private banks to 
underestimate the ALLL when bank profitability is low. I predict that if bank supervision 
was lax, public banks would overestimate the ALLL relative to their private counterfactuals 
between 2002 and 2007 and underestimate the ALLL relative to their private 
counterfactuals between 2008 and 2015.  
By balancing 55 covariates that confound the effect of reporting incentives due to 
public listing on the ALLL estimations, I create a pseudo-population of public and private 
banks from which the unbiased effect can be estimated. I find that public banks, especially 
state-chartered public banks, slightly overestimated the ALLL between 2002 and 2005 and 
significantly underestimated the ALLL between 2013 and 2015. Public and private banks 
did not differ in their ALLL estimations during the financial crisis and the rest of the sample 
period. Bank supervision of the ALLL estimations was effective between 2002 and 2012, 
but has become lax recently. The results imply that bank regulators are only willing to cater 
to banks’ private interests when the economic environment is good and the regulatory 
emphasis is weak, but not during the financial crisis.  
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Appendix A Covariate Definitions 
 
I. Covariates that reflect loan portfolio characteristics 
 
• Volume of loans past due 30-89 days and still accruing principal and interest payments 
(scaled by total loans) by loan category. 
1) Residential real estate loans (RRE.PD30) 
2) Commercial real estate loans (CRE.PD30) 
3) Commercial and industrial loans (CI.PD30) 
4) Consumer loans (CS.PD30) 
5) Loans secured by farmland (FARM.PD30) 
6) Agricultural loans (AG.PD30) 
 
• Volume of loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing principal and interest 
payments (scaled by total loans) by loan category. 
7) Residential real estate loans (RRE.PD90) 
8) Commercial real estate loans (CRE.PD90) 
9) Commercial and industrial loans (CI.PD90) 
10) Consumer loans (CS.PD90) 
11) Loans secured by farmland (FARM.PD90) 
12) Agricultural loans (AG.PD90) 
 
• Volume of nonaccrual loans (scaled by total loans) by loan category. 
13) Residential real estate loans (RRE.NAC) 
14) Commercial real estate loans (CRE.NAC) 
15) Commercial and industrial loans (CI.NAC) 
16) Consumer loans (CS.NAC) 
17) Loans secured by farmland (FARM.NAC) 
18) Agricultural loans (AG.NAC) 
 
• Growth of total past due and nonaccrual loans: year-over-year change of total volume 
of problem loans. 
19) Total loans past due 30-89 days and still accruing principal and interest 
payments (PD30.G) 
20) Total loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing principal and interest 
payments (PD90.G) 
21) Total nonaccrual loans (NAC.G) 
 
• Current-year loan loss rate by loan category: current-year net charge-offs (charge-offs 
minus recoveries) of each loan category divided by total loans.  
22) Residential real estate loans (RRE.NCH) 
23) Commercial real estate loans (CRE.NCH) 
24) Commercial and industrial loans (CI.NCH) 
25) Consumer loans (CS.NCH) 
26) Loans secured by farmland (FARM.NCH) 
27) Agricultural loans (AG.NCH) 
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• Loan growth: year-over-year change of loan volume of each loan category. 
28) Residential real estate loans (RRE.G) 
29) Commercial real estate loans (CRE.G) 
30) Commercial and industrial loans (CI.G) 
31) Consumer loans (CS.G) 
32) Loans secured by farmland (FARM.G) 
33) Agricultural loans (AG.G) 
 
• Credits of concentration: loan volume of each loan category divided by the sum of Tier 
1 risk-based capital and the ALLL. 
34) Residential real estate loans (RRE.CON) 
35) Commercial real estate loans (CRE.CON) 
36) Commercial and industrial loans (CI.CON) 
37) Consumer loans (CS.CON) 
38) Loans secured by farmland (FARM.CON) 
39) Agricultural loans (AG.CON) 
 
 
II. Covariates that reflect institutional characteristics 
 
40) Type (TYPE): an indicator variable. “1” if a bank’s holding parent is a financial 
holding company (FHC), “0” if a bank’s holding parent is a bank holding 
company (BHC). 
41) Bank size (SIZE): the natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
• Capital adequacy 
42) Tier 1 leverage ratio (T1LR): the ratio of Tier 1 capital divided by total assets 
for the leverage ratio purpose. 
43) Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (T1CR): the ratio of Tier 1 capital divided by 
total risk-weighted assets. 
44) Total risk-based capital ratio (TTCR): the ratio of total capital divided by total 
risk-weighted assets. 
45) Total delinquent loans to the ALLL (DELAL): total delinquent loans are the 
sum of total loans past due 30-89 days and still accruing principal and interest 
payments, total loans past due 90 days or more and still accruing principal and 
interest payments, and total nonaccrual loans.  
 
• Asset quality 
46) Private securities to total assets (PSEC): private securities are available-for-
sale and held-to-maturity securities, excluding U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. 
Government agency obligations, and mortgage-backed securities issued or 
guaranteed by the U.S. Government or U.S. Government-sponsored agencies. 
 
• Management quality 
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47) Efficiency ratio (EFF): the ratio of noninterest expense to sum of net interest 
income and noninterest income. 
 
• Earnings 
48) Return on assets (ROA): the ratio of income (loss) before extraordinary items 
and other adjustments to total assets. 
49) Return on equity (ROE): the ratio of income (loss) before extraordinary items 
and other adjustments to total equity capital. 
50) Net interest margin (NIM): the ratio of net interest income to total assets. 
 
• Liquidity 
51) Core deposits to total assets (CD): prior to March 31, 2010, core deposits equal 
the sum of all transaction accounts, nontransaction money market deposit 
accounts, other nontransaction savings deposits, total time deposits of less than 
$100,000, and total deposits in foreign offices (if applicable) minus total 
brokered retail deposits issued in denominations of less than $100,000. 
Beginning March 31, 2010, core deposits equal the sum of all transaction 
accounts, nontransaction money market deposit accounts, other nontransaction 
savings deposits, total time deposits of $250,000 or less, and total deposits in 
foreign offices (if applicable) minus total brokered retail deposits issued in 
denominations of $250,000 or less. 
52) Volatile liability dependence ratio (VLDR): prior to March 31, 2010, the ratio 
equals the sum of total interest-bearing deposits in foreign and domestic offices, 
total time deposits of $100,000 or more, federal funds purchased, securities sold 
under agreements to repurchase, other borrowed money, and total trading 
liabilities minus federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to 
resell, and total trading assets. Beginning March 31, 2010, the ratio equals the 
sum of total interest-bearing deposits in foreign and domestic offices, total time 
deposits of more than $250,000, federal funds purchased, securities sold under 
agreements to repurchase, other borrowed money, and total trading liabilities  
minus federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to resell, and 
total trading assets. The ratio measures the extent to which a bank funds long-
term investments with short-term liabilities. 
53) Liquid assets to total assets (LQ): liquid assets are the sum of interest-bearing 
assets, federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreement to resell, debt 
securities with a remaining maturity of one year or less, and loans and leases 
with a remaining maturity of one year or less. 
 
• Sensitivity to market risk 
54) Return to risky assets (RORA): the ratio of total noninterest income minus 
income from fiduciary activities and service charges on deposit accounts to total 
assets. 
55) Large time deposits with maturity less than one year to total assets (LTD): large 
time deposits are time deposits of $100,000 or more.  
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III. Covariates that reflect regional economic conditions 
 
The following covariates are not used in the propensity score estimation model, but 
are checked for balances between public and private banks.  
 
56) State unemployment rate (UNST) 
57) State GDP growth (GDPST)  
58) State year-over-year change of housing permit (value) (PMST) 
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Figure 1  Plots of ROA, ROE, Net Interest Margin, and Total Loan Growth of Public and Private Banks  
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Figure 2 Illustration of Steps to Estimate Loan Losses under FAS 5 and FAS 114 
 
FAS 5 
Three steps: 
1. Segmenting the loan pool by common risk 
characteristics 
2. Calculating adjusted historical loan loss rates 
3. Estimating losses on segments of loans 
All loans 
Is the loan 
considered 
individually 
impaired? 
FAS 114 
Three impairment measurement methods: 
1. Fair value of the collateral if the loan is 
collateral-dependent 
2. Present value of expected future cash flows 
3. The loan’s observable market price 
Yes 
No 
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Figure 3 Standardized Mean Differences (SMDs) of the 58 Covariates in Unmatched, Matched, and 
Weighted Samples 
The following 14 graphs plot the SMDs of the 58 covariates as defined in Appendix A in the unmatched, the matched, and 
the weighted samples by sample year from 2002 to 2015. A matched sample is created from one-to-one without-replacement 
matching on the logit of the propensity score 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, with a caliper of width equal to 0.2 of the standard deviation of the logit of 
the propensity score. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is estimated from a logistic regression with the first 55 covariates as defined in Appendix A and the 
state fixed effects. A weighted sample is created from weighting each bank observation 𝑖𝑖 in the unmatched sample by the 
matching weight min (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,1−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖+(1−𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)(1−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) (Li and Greene 2013), where 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 1 if bank 𝑖𝑖 is public and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 0 if bank 𝑖𝑖 is private. 
The vertical straight line to the right of 0.0 represents SMD = 0.1. In general, an SMD < 0.1 suggests that the covariate is 
balanced between the comparison groups, whereas an SMD > 0.1 suggests that the covariate is unbalanced between the 
comparison groups and may contribute bias to the effect estimation. Please refer to Appendix A for definitions of the 58 
covariates. 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
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  Figure 2 (continued) 
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  Figure 2 (continued) 
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Figure 2 (continued)  
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Figure 4 Plots of Ratios of Total Non-Current Loans and Total Net Charge-Offs to Total Loans of Public and Private Banks  
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Table 1 Comparison of Concentrations of Credit between Public and Private Banks  
This table presents the average concentrations of credit of loan categories held by public and private banks on the last day of each sample year from 2002 to 2015. 
The concentration of credit of each loan category is calculated as the amount of loans in each category divided by the sum of Tier 1 risk-based capital and the ALLL. 
P-values are calculated under the Kruskal-Wallis Rank Sum Test. The null hypothesis of the test is that the two comparison groups originate from the same distribution. 
SMD stands for standardized mean difference. In general, an SMD < 0.1 suggests that the variable is balanced between the two comparison groups, whereas an 
SMD > 0.1 suggests that the variable is unbalanced between the two comparison groups and may contribute bias to the effect estimation. 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Total Loans and Leases 
Public 7.165 7.179 7.435 7.429 7.516 7.620 7.515 7.025 6.450 6.008 6.074 6.215 6.567 6.677 
Private 6.341 6.186 6.272 6.280 6.311 6.360 6.544 6.391 6.082 5.728 5.604 5.538 5.682 5.678 
p  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.005 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.318 0.461 0.547 0.532 0.409 0.588 0.456 0.271 0.162 0.151 0.243 0.376 0.326 0.544 
1. Loans Secured by Real  
Estate 
Public 4.871 5.058 5.417 5.520 5.651 5.742 5.666 5.330 4.857 4.402 4.373 4.424 4.670 4.671 
Private 3.884 3.894 4.060 4.134 4.199 4.264 4.474 4.424 4.231 3.982 3.897 3.816 3.920 3.926 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.467 0.584 0.666 0.665 0.617 0.705 0.566 0.400 0.278 0.231 0.258 0.355 0.294 0.423 
1.1 Secured by 1-4 Family 
Residential Properties 
Public 2.030 1.974 2.065 1.934 1.851 1.825 1.836 1.800 1.755 1.683 1.705 1.655 1.678 1.678 
Private 1.706 1.603 1.609 1.570 1.537 1.524 1.613 1.632 1.580 1.511 1.486 1.433 1.469 1.474 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.243 0.298 0.352 0.279 0.234 0.223 0.175 0.137 0.143 0.153 0.193 0.215 0.204 0.197 
1.2 Secured by Commercial 
Properties 
Public 2.727 2.958 3.226 3.455 3.670 3.792 3.702 3.407 2.996 2.615 2.574 2.670 2.891 2.884 
Private 1.693 1.806 1.958 2.075 2.172 2.238 2.340 2.253 2.102 1.932 1.860 1.821 1.875 1.851 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.644 0.708 0.749 0.776 0.792 0.864 0.758 0.615 0.497 0.491 0.517 0.643 0.469 0.746 
1.2.1 Construction and Land 
Development 
Public 0.628 0.721 0.902 1.123 1.331 1.407 1.199 0.841 0.571 0.408 0.356 0.357 0.403 0.446 
Private 0.384 0.425 0.508 0.603 0.690 0.734 0.692 0.548 0.427 0.337 0.309 0.308 0.329 0.337 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.012 0.005 0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.395 0.438 0.498 0.556 0.619 0.646 0.564 0.394 0.260 0.197 0.145 0.161 0.207 0.303 
1.2.2 Secured by Multi-
Family Residential 
Properties 
Public 0.168 0.187 0.197 0.201 0.192 0.202 0.212 0.225 0.216 0.219 0.237 0.292 0.345 0.349 
Private 0.092 0.100 0.106 0.106 0.107 0.112 0.130 0.142 0.140 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.151 0.149 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.282 0.293 0.326 0.313 0.310 0.305 0.298 0.289 0.312 0.327 0.397 0.467 0.417 0.472 
1.2.3 Secured by Nonfarm 
Nonresidential Properties 
Public 1.932 2.051 2.128 2.131 2.147 2.183 2.291 2.340 2.209 1.988 1.981 2.021 2.142 2.090 
Private 1.217 1.280 1.344 1.365 1.376 1.393 1.519 1.563 1.534 1.455 1.412 1.374 1.394 1.364 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
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SMD 0.623 0.680 0.693 0.674 0.638 0.710 0.663 0.606 0.498 0.493 0.519 0.622 0.436 0.691 
1.3 Secured by Farmland 
Public 0.111 0.121 0.122 0.126 0.125 0.118 0.119 0.117 0.105 0.104 0.092 0.094 0.100 0.109 
Private 0.485 0.486 0.494 0.489 0.490 0.502 0.521 0.539 0.550 0.538 0.551 0.562 0.576 0.600 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.825 0.791 0.799 0.775 0.771 0.818 0.847 0.872 0.927 0.929 0.961 0.964 0.965 0.966 
2. Commercial & Industrial 
Loans 
Public 1.235 1.188 1.192 1.157 1.161 1.194 1.223 1.075 0.982 0.960 1.033 1.078 1.197 1.197 
Private 1.035 1.001 0.990 0.976 0.975 0.977 0.974 0.907 0.844 0.796 0.781 0.782 0.789 0.779 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.230 0.236 0.256 0.234 0.210 0.283 0.316 0.239 0.206 0.242 0.345 0.398 0.519 0.552 
3. Consumer Loans 
Public 0.737 0.643 0.563 0.501 0.446 0.427 0.387 0.383 0.375 0.381 0.380 0.394 0.365 0.425 
Private 0.686 0.615 0.557 0.516 0.487 0.464 0.438 0.411 0.375 0.339 0.320 0.305 0.302 0.295 
p 0.043 0.225 0.766 0.474 0.033 0.066 0.009 0.152 0.981 0.044 0.006 <0.001 0.005 <0.001 
SMD 0.060 0.038 0.010 0.023 0.070 0.061 0.094 0.052 0.001 0.071 0.101 0.148 0.119 0.204 
4. Agricultural Loans 
Public 0.092 0.079 0.080 0.082 0.073 0.069 0.072 0.071 0.063 0.064 0.057 0.061 0.059 0.068 
Private 0.633 0.579 0.571 0.561 0.557 0.557 0.556 0.550 0.534 0.520 0.516 0.539 0.576 0.581 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.838 0.829 0.811 0.796 0.801 0.808 0.800 0.792 0.808 0.781 0.790 0.792 0.812 0.817 
5. Municipal Loans 
Public 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.043 0.047 0.056 0.059 0.066 0.069 0.090 0.107 0.121 
Private 0.037 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.041 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.041 0.043 
p 0.006 0.017 0.012 0.045 0.037 0.250 0.145 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.096 0.086 0.091 0.075 0.076 0.044 0.057 0.126 0.150 0.227 0.245 0.358 0.428 0.430 
6. Loans to Depository 
Institutions 
Public 0.055 0.036 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.019 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.005 0.008 
Private 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.001 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.044 0.030 0.029 0.232 0.007 <0.001 
SMD 0.157 0.194 0.158 0.151 0.133 0.140 0.124 0.133 0.091 0.102 0.096 0.069 0.094 0.137 
7. Loans to Foreign 
Governments 
Public 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Private 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p 0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.964 0.747 0.600 0.570 <0.001 0.213 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 <0.001 
SMD 0.080 0.080 0.094 0.002 0.016 0.020 0.025 0.124 0.062 0.098 0.101 0.160 0.074 0.132 
8. Other Loans 
Public 0.064 0.061 0.056 0.054 0.059 0.069 0.062 0.051 0.055 0.072 0.093 0.095 0.096 0.125 
Private 0.029 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.033 0.032 0.031 0.028 0.028 0.030 0.032 0.031 
p <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.245 0.228 0.224 0.240 0.223 0.239 0.202 0.137 0.183 0.228 0.278 0.286 0.277 0.350 
9. Lease Financing 
Receivables 
Public 0.066 0.067 0.065 0.054 0.069 0.056 0.047 0.049 0.051 0.052 0.061 0.063 0.068 0.059 
Private 0.033 0.026 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.024 0.023 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.021 
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p 0.038 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
SMD 0.093 0.221 0.215 0.162 0.141 0.153 0.131 0.115 0.150 0.157 0.166 0.159 0.197 0.181 
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Table 2 Estimated ALLL Differences between Public and Private Banks 
This table presents the estimated effects (coefficinets on “Public”) of reporting incentives due to public listing on the ALLL estimations under an OLS model and 
the weighting method. The dependent variable in all methods is 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿. The control variables are the first 55 covariates as defined in Appendix A, but the 
coefficients on the 55 covariates are not reported. The numbers of public and private banks in the parentheses reported under the weighting method are effective 
numbers of banks in the sample after applying the matching weights to the sample. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in the parentheses 
under “Public”. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
 OLS, with controls and state FE  Weighted, without controls and state FE  Weighted, with controls and state FE 
 Public R-squared # Public # Private  Public R-squared # Public # Private  Public R-squared # Public # Private 
2002 0.0010*** (0.0003) 0.599 661 3493  
0.0004 
(0.0003) 0.001 
661 
(263.6) 
3493 
(261.0)  
0.0004*** 
(0.0002) 0.794 
661 
(263.6) 
3493 
(261.0) 
               
2003 0.0016*** (0.0003) 0.609 652 3508  
0.0004 
(0.0006) 0.001 
652 
(260.3) 
3508 
(252.7)  
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 0.813 
652 
(260.3) 
3508 
(252.7) 
               
2004 0.0013*** (0.0003) 0.692 607 3546  
0.0008 
(0.0006) 0.003 
607 
(273.8) 
3546 
(269.0)  
0.0006* 
(0.0003) 0.733 
607 
(273.8) 
3546 
(269.0) 
               
2005 0.0006* (0.0003) 0.618 467 2060  
0.0006 
(0.0006) 0.004 
467 
(146.3) 
2060 
(141.4)  
0.0005* 
(0.0003) 0.816 
467 
(146.3) 
2060 
(141.4) 
               
2006 0.0008** (0.0003) 0.492 460 2032  
0.0004 
(0.0006) 0.002 
460 
(147.0) 
2032 
(147.2)  
0.0004 
(0.0003) 0.736 
460 
(147.0) 
2032 
(147.2) 
               
2007 0.0007** (0.0003) 0.648 426 1949  
0.0002 
(0.0005) 0.000 
426 
(149.9) 
1949 
(147.0)  
0.0003 
(0.0002) 0.830 
426 
(149.9) 
1949 
(147.0) 
               
2008 -0.0000 (0.0004) 0.700 415 2031  
0.0003 
(0.0009) 0.000 
415 
(171.7) 
2031 
(165.6)  
0.0000 
(0.0003) 0.877 
415 
(171.7) 
2031 
(165.6) 
               
2009 0.0009 (0.0006) 0.705 404 2075  
0.0011 
(0.0010) 0.003 
404 
(140.9) 
404 
(140.9)  
0.0010* 
(0.0005) 0.819 
404 
(140.9) 
2075 
(142.6) 
               
2010 0.0015** (0.0006) 0.712 366 2070  
0.0008 
(0.0014) 0.001 
366 
(146.5) 
2070 
(145.5)  
0.0006 
(0.0006) 0.824 
366 
(146.5) 
2070 
(145.5) 
               
2011 0.0004 (0.0008) 0.579 342 2080  
0.0004 
(0.0011) 0.000 
342 
(133.8) 
2080 
(134.3)  
0.0005 
(0.0007) 0.653 
342 
(133.8) 
2080 
(134.3) 
               
2012 -0.0004 (0.0007) 0.523 316 2016  
-0.0000 
(0.0016) 0.000 
316 
(116.1) 
2016 
(114.7)  
0.0001 
(0.0005) 0.748 
316 
(116.1) 
2016 
(114.7) 
               
2013 -0.0012* (0.0006) 0.545 331 2008  
-0.0017* 
(0.0010) 0.013 
331 
(121.0) 
2008 
(120.9)  
-0.0016*** 
(0.0006) 0.703 
331 
(121.0) 
2008 
(120.9) 
               
2014 -0.0014*** (0.0005) 0.622 283 1972  
-0.0016** 
(0.0007) 0.017 
283 
(103.4) 
1972 
(101.7)  
-0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 0.768 
283 
(103.4) 
1972 
(101.7) 
               
2015 -0.0012*** (0.0004) 0.524 320 1840  
-0.0013** 
(0.0005) 0.017 
320  
(98.2) 
1840 
(99.4)  
-0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 0.694 
320  
(98.2) 
1840 
(99.4) 
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Table 3 Estimated ALLL Differences between Federally Chartered Public and Private Banks and 
between State-Chartered Public and Private Banks 
This table presents the estimated effects of reporting incentives due to public listing on the ALLL estimations between 
federally chartered public and private banks and between state-chartered public and private banks. The estimation method 
is a matching-weight weighted regression with the dependent variable 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , the first 55 covariates as defined in 
Appendix A as control variables, and the state fixed effects. The “Public” dummy is interacted with an indicator variable 
“State charter”, which equals “1” for banks with a state charter and “0” for banks with a federal charter. The ALLL 
differences between federally chartered public and private banks are the coefficients on the “Public” dummy. The ALLL 
differences between state-chartered public and private banks are the combined coefficients on “Public” and “Public × State 
charter”. Standard errors are clustered at the state level and are reported in parentheses under the coefficients. The numbers 
in parentheses under columns “# Public” and “# Private” are effective numbers of public and private banks in the sample 
after applying the matching weights to the sample. The coefficients on the 55 covariates are not reported. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
 
ALLL Differences 
between Federally 
Chartered Public and 
Private Banks 
ALLL Differences 
between State-
Chartered Public and 
Private Banks 
R-squared # Public # Private 
2002 0.0003 (0.0004) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 0.796 661 (263.6) 3493 (261.0) 
2003 -0.0002 (0.0005) 
0.0007** 
(0.0004) 0.816 652 (260.3) 3508 (252.7) 
2004 0.0006 (0.0005) 
0.0006* 
(0.0004) 0.733 607 (273.8) 3546 (269.0) 
2005 0.0004 (0.0005) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 0.817 467 (146.3) 2060 (141.4) 
2006 0.0003 (0.0006) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 0.737 460 (147.0) 2032 (147.2) 
2007 0.0005 (0.0003) 
0.0002 
(0.0002) 0.831 426 (149.9) 1949 (147.0) 
2008 0.0002 (0.0005) 
-0.0000 
(0.0004) 0.877 415 (171.7) 2031 (165.6) 
2009 0.0011 
(0.0009) 
0.0009 
(0.0006) 
0.822 404 (140.9) 2075 (142.6) 
2010 0.0004 
(0.0007) 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
0.826 366 (146.5) 2070 (145.5) 
2011 0.0008 
(0.0011) 
0.0006 
(0.0008) 
0.660 342 (133.8) 2080 (134.3) 
2012 0.0010 
(0.0011) 
-0.0003 
(0.0006) 
0.751 316 (116.1) 2016 (114.7) 
2013 0.0001 
(0.0010) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
0.708 331 (121.0) 2008 (120.9) 
2014 -0.0009** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
0.769 283 (103.4) 1972 (101.7) 
2015 -0.0007* 
(0.0004) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 
0.696 320 (98.2) 1840 (99.4) 
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Table 4 Estimated ALLL Differences between State-Chartered Public and Private Banks in More and 
Less Leniently Supervised States 
This table presents the estimated effects of reporting incentives due to public listing on the ALLL estimations from two 
subsamples consisting of only state-chartered banks: state-chartered banks located in more leniently supervised states and 
state-chartered banks located in less leniently supervised states. More leniently supervised states are states with an above-
average state leniency index as computed in Agarwal et al. (2014), and less leniently supervised states are states with an 
average or below-average state leniency index. The estimation method for both subsamples is a matching-weight weighted 
regression with the dependent variable 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , the first 55 covariates as defined in Appendix A as control variables, 
and the state fixed effects. The matching weight for each bank observation 𝑖𝑖 is calculated from min (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,1−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖+(1−𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)(1−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) (Li and 
Greene 2013), where 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 1 if bank 𝑖𝑖 is public, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 0 if bank 𝑖𝑖 is private, and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is the estimated propensity score for bank 
𝑖𝑖. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is estimated from a logistic regression using the 55 covariates and the state fixed effects. Column “Public” lists the 
coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses and clustered at the state level) on the “Public” dummy. The numbers in 
parentheses under columns “# Public” and “# Private” are effective numbers of public and private banks in the sample after 
applying the matching weights to the sample. The coefficients on the 55 covariates are not reported. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; 
***p<0.01. 
 State Leniency Index > Mean  State Leniency Index ≤ Mean 
 Public R-squared # Public # Private  Public R-squared # Public # Private 
2002 0.0003 (0.0002) 0.816 187 (76.8) 1282 (72.3) 
 0.0002 
(0.0002) 0.896 217 (71.5) 1277 (71.5) 
          
2003 0.0010*** (0.0003) 0.781 209 (78.7) 1301 (74.8) 
 0.0002 
(0.0007) 0.826 213 (71.4) 1302 (70.2) 
          
2004 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.786 199 (86.8) 1333 (89.0) 
 0.0006 
(0.0005) 0.861 190 (74.9) 1318 (72.5) 
          
2005 0.0008** (0.0004) 0.824 175 (49.7) 854 (47.4) 
 0.0004* 
(0.0002) 0.916 129 (22.1) 690 (23.9) 
          
2006 -0.0005** (0.0002) 0.775 190 (47.3) 842 (47.5) 
 0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 0.862 122 (33.9) 698 (33.1) 
          
2007 -0.0001 (0.0003) 0.879 160 (48.1) 817 (45.1) 
 0.0002 
(0.0002) 0.917 122 (37.0) 664 (36.9) 
          
2008 0.0002 (0.0005) 0.874 163 (62.0) 885 (58.8) 
 -0.0004 
(0.0003) 0.911 123 (35.4) 690 (34.8) 
          
2009 0.0008 (0.0008) 0.919 153 (45.9) 903 (43.8) 
 0.0009*** 
(0.0003) 0.937 125 (29.4) 706 (27.0) 
          
2010 0.0002 (0.0009) 0.922 140 (48.9) 908 (45.4) 
 0.0001 
(0.0005) 0.936 103 (39.3) 704 (39.4) 
          
2011 0.0010** (0.0005) 0.862 124 (36.3) 922 (36.1) 
 0.0002 
(0.0006) 0.907 104 (38.2) 714 (38.5) 
          
2012 -0.0012*** (0.0004) 0.825 124 (34.2) 893 (32.9) 
 -0.0006 
(0.0009) 0.784 96 (33.5) 696 (33.9) 
          
2013 -0.0023*** (0.0006) 0.726 132 (43.6) 908 (43.9) 
 -0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 0.853 96 (29.3) 704 (30.9) 
          
2014 -0.0013*** (0.0004) 0.826 112 (29.8) 895 (28.4) 
 -0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 0.823 94 (27.0) 709 (26.6) 
          
2015 -0.0018*** (0.0004) 0.816 130 (35.7) 818 (35.5) 
 -0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 0.873 99 (32.0) 683 (31.3) 
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Table 5 Tests for the Existence of Stock Market Discipline  
This table presents the estimated effects of reporting incentives due to public listing on the ALLL estimations under three 
sample splits. Panel A splits the sample of public banks by the average percentage of institutional ownership. Panel B splits 
the sample of public banks by the average institutional ownership Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). Panel C splits the 
sample of public banks by the average number of institutional block owners. All private banks are retained as the comparison 
group for each split sample. The estimation method for all split samples is a matching-weight weighted regression with the 
dependent variable 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , the first 55 covariates as defined in Appendix A as control variables, and the state fixed 
effects. The matching weight for each bank observation 𝑖𝑖 is calculated from min (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,1−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖)
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖+(1−𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖)(1−𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) (Li and Greene 2013), where 
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 1 if bank 𝑖𝑖 is public, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 0 if bank 𝑖𝑖 is private, and 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is the estimated propensity score for bank 𝑖𝑖. 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 is estimated 
from a logistic regression including the 55 covariates and the state fixed effects. Column “Public” lists the coefficients and 
standard errors (in parentheses and clustered at the state level) on the “Public” dummy. The numbers in parentheses under 
columns “# Public” and “# Private” are effective numbers of public and private banks in the sample after applying the 
matching weights to the sample. The coefficients on the 55 covariates are not reported. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
Panel A Split of Public Banks by Percentage of Institutional Ownership 
    
 Percentage of Institutional Ownership > Mean  Percentage of Institutional Ownership ≤ Mean 
 Public R-squared # Public # Private  Public R-squared # Public # Private 
2002 0.0007** (0.0003) 0.923 225 (42.0) 3493 (43.0) 
 0.0003* 
(0.0002) 0.759 320 (184.8) 3493 (186.2) 
          
2003 0.0007 (0.0006) 0.879 224 (54.2) 3508 (53.5) 
 0.0001 
(0.0002) 0.775 314 (181.1) 3508 (179.5) 
          
2004 0.0015*** (0.0004) 0.874 204 (64.9) 3546 (67.7) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0002) 0.804 302 (192.3) 3546 (191.0) 
          
2005 0.0002 (0.0003) 0.892 169 (35.0) 2060 (36.5) 
 0.0002 
(0.0002) 0.776 225 (100.2) 2060 (97.4) 
          
2006 0.0000 (0.0004) 0.782 174 (41.0) 2032 (41.4) 
 0.0003 
(0.0002) 0.821 211 (99.6) 2032 (100.6) 
          
2007 0.0007 (0.0005) 0.864 155 (34.0) 1949 (35.5) 
 0.0001 
(0.0002) 0.851 207 (102.7) 1949 (101.1) 
          
2008 -0.0005 (0.0004) 0.937 141 (27.7) 2031 (27.7) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0003) 0.812 212 (125.7) 2031 (124.1) 
          
2009 0.0015 (0.0009) 0.922 145 (30.0) 2075 (28.8) 
 -0.0000 
(0.0003) 0.830 194 (93.4) 2075 (93.6) 
          
2010 0.0004 (0.0006) 0.933 156 (27.4) 2070 (27.1) 
 -0.0002 
(0.0006) 0.858 180 (97.5) 2070 (97.8) 
          
2011 -0.0003 (0.0009) 0.793 160 (31.3) 2080 (32.1) 
 0.0000 
 (0.0007) 0.819 162 (90.4) 2080 (90.4) 
          
2012 -0.0020*** (0.0007) 0.836 146 (22.0) 2016 (20.7) 
 -0.0007 
(0.0006) 0.800 151 (74.8) 2016 (73.0) 
          
2013 -0.0024*** (0.0008) 0.901 153 (14.6) 2008 (15.8) 
 -0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 0.708 163 (85.3) 2008 (86.8) 
          
2014 -0.0007*** (0.0004) 0.920 143 (17.0) 1972 (15.2) 
 -0.0015*** 
(0.0003) 0.786 134 (64.6) 1972 (62.8) 
          
2015 -0.0014*** (0.0005) 0.784 156 (17.9) 1840 (17.4) 
 -0.0008*** 
(0.0003) 0.754 161 (72.4) 1840 (74.9) 
Panel B Split of Public Banks by Institutional Ownership HHI 
    
 Institutional Ownership HHI > Mean  Institutional Ownership HHI ≤ Mean 
 Public R-squared # Public # Private  Public R-squared # Public # Private 
2002 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.790 168 (118.8) 3493 (119.6)  
 0.0002 
(0.0002) 0.804 377 (129.3) 3493 (124.7) 
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2003 0.0004 (0.0003) 0.824 158 (105.6) 3508 (105.6) 
 0.0004 
(0.0003) 0.754 380 (145.6) 3508 (140.8) 
          
2004 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.836 157 (110.9) 3546 (113.2) 
 0.0007 
(0.0004) 0.738 349 (153.9) 3546 (150.1) 
          
2005 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.786 128 (66.1) 2060 (65.8) 
 0.0007* 
(0.0003) 0.843 266 (78.0) 2060 (79.9) 
          
2006 0.0006*** (0.0002) 0.854 122 (65.6) 2032 (64.3) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0003) 0.685 263 (74.8) 2032 (75.8) 
          
2007 -0.0000 (0.0003) 0.893 119 (67.3) 1949 (68.2) 
 0.0005 
(0.0003) 0.830 243 (71.9) 1949 (71.4) 
          
2008 0.0002 (0.0003) 0.882 120 (75.6) 2031 (73.4) 
 -0.0000 
(0.0004) 0.830 233 (88.2) 2031 (89.1) 
          
2009 0.0007** (0.0003) 0.942 114 (57.2) 2075 (57.9) 
 0.0012** 
(0.0006) 0.843 225 (70.2) 2075 (69.7) 
          
2010 0.0003 (0.0007) 0.884 114 (71.0) 2070 (72.0) 
 0.0005 
(0.0007) 0.864 223 (69.8) 2070 (71.9) 
          
2011 -0.0001 (0.0006) 0.843 113 (70.6) 2080 (67.8) 
 -0.0005 
 (0.0007) 0.777 209 (56.6) 2080 (58.8) 
          
2012 -0.0007 (0.0006) 0.837 92 (55.9) 2016 (54.5) 
 0.0006 
(0.0007) 0.780 205 (50.3) 2016 (49.3) 
          
2013 -0.0013*** (0.0003) 0.744 102 (59.2) 2008 (60.8) 
 -0.0019*** 
(0.0006) 0.780 214 (49.9) 2008 (50.3) 
          
2014 -0.0015*** (0.0003) 0.808 88 (58.5) 1972 (55.2) 
 -0.0012*** 
(0.0003) 0.894 189 (34.0) 1972 (34.4) 
          
2015 -0.0009*** (0.0003) 0.796 92 (47.4) 1840 (49.4) 
 -0.0013*** 
(0.0003) 0.755 225 (50.7) 1840 (50.6) 
Panel C Split of Public Banks by Number of Institutional Block Owners 
    
 Number of Institutional Block Owners > Mean  Number of Institutional Block Owners ≤ Mean 
 Public R-squared # Public # Private  Public R-squared # Public # Private 
2002 -0.0000 (0.0003) 0.839 180 (79.4) 3493 (80.8) 
 0.0005** 
(0.0002) 0.829 365 (165.8) 3493 (167.5) 
          
2003 0.0004 (0.0004) 0.743 240 (99.5) 3508 (101.5) 
 0.0002 
(0.0003) 0.794 298 (160.2) 3508 (154.0) 
          
2004 0.0009* (0.0005) 0.847 235 (113.2) 3546 (116.5) 
 0.0000 
(0.0002) 0.727 271 (157.6) 3546 (155.1) 
          
2005 -0.0001 (0.0002) 0.897 199 (66.6) 2060 (65.9) 
 0.0007** 
(0.0003) 0.795 195 (84.0) 2060 (81.7) 
          
2006 0.0003 (0.0003) 0.802 195 (63.4) 2032 (62.4) 
 0.0000 
(0.0001) 0.700 190 (83.9) 2032 (84.0) 
          
2007 0.0005 (0.0003) 0.903 98 (39.4) 1949 (38.1) 
 0.0002 
(0.0002) 0.865 264 (107.9) 1949 (107.4) 
          
2008 0.0000 (0.0004) 0.915 105 (34.2) 2031 (34.5) 
 -0.0001 
(0.0003) 0.825 248 (128.4) 2031 (126.7) 
          
2009 0.0004 (0.0008) 0.930 118 (26.7) 2075 (24.2) 
 0.0010** 
(0.0004) 0.881 221 (98.8) 2075 (100.3) 
          
2010 -0.0012 (0.0007) 0.907 136 (40.4) 2070 (40.5) 
 0.0005 
(0.0006) 0.865 201 (98.6) 2070 (96.5) 
          
2011 -0.0000 (0.0007) 0.772 147 (55.7) 2080 (55.9) 
 0.0002 
 (0.0007) 0.811 175 (77.6) 2080 (76.3) 
          
2012 -0.0007 (0.0006) 0.766 166 (49.6) 2016 (47.8) 
 -0.0005 
(0.0006) 0.818 131 (63.4) 2016 (62.3) 
          
2013 -0.0014** (0.0006) 0.817 152 (43.8) 2008 (42.6) 
 -0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 0.756 164 (78.7) 2008 (78.8) 
          
2014 -0.0012*** 0.822 145 (33.9) 1972 (32.3)  -0.0011*** 0.844 132 (65.9) 1972 (65.4) 
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(0.0004) (0.0003) 
          
2015 -0.0015*** (0.0005) 0.624 161 (35.6) 1840 (36.0) 
 -0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 0.787 156 (62.0) 1840 (63.4)  
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Table 6 Sensitivity Analysis 
This table compares the estimated effects of reporting incentives due to public listing on the ALLL estimations using two 
different loan loss rate calculations. Columns (1), (3), and (5) of this table respectively list the ALLL differences between 
public and private banks as reported in Table 2, and between federally chartered public and private banks and between state-
chartered public and private banks as reported in Table 3. Columns (2), (4), and (6) of this table list the effects estimated 
with an alternative loan loss rate. The alternative loan loss rate is calculated by dividing the average of current-year and 
prior-year net charge-offs by current-year total loans. This loan loss rate calculation replaces the calculations for covariates 
(22) to (27) in Appendix A. Except for the change in the loan loss rate calculation, the estimation methods for columns (2), 
(4), and (6) follows the estimation methods for columns (1), (3), and (5), respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses 
and are clustered at the state level. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 All banks  Federally chartered banks   State-chartered banks 
 As reported in Table 2 
With alternative 
loan loss rate 
 As reported in 
Table 3 
With alternative 
loan loss rate 
 As reported in 
Table 3 
With alternative 
loan loss rate 
   
 
  
 
  
2002 0.0004***  (0.0002) 
0.0004***  
(0.0002)  
0.0003  
(0.0004) 
0.0003  
(0.0004)  
0.0005**  
(0.0002) 
0.0005**  
(0.0002) 
2003 0.0005*  (0.0003) 
0.0003  
(0.0003)  
-0.0002  
(0.0005) 
-0.0002  
(0.0005)  
0.0007**  
(0.0004) 
0.0006*  
(0.0003) 
2004 0.0006*  (0.0003) 
0.0005*  
(0.0003)  
0.0006  
(0.0005) 
0.0004  
(0.0004)  
0.0006*  
(0.0004) 
0.0005  
(0.0004) 
2005 0.0005*  (0.0003) 
0.0004  
(0.0003)  
0.0004  
(0.0005) 
0.0004  
(0.0005)  
0.0005  
(0.0003) 
0.0004  
(0.0004) 
2006 0.0004  (0.0003) 
0.0006**  
(0.0002)  
0.0003  
(0.0006) 
0.0007*  
(0.0004)  
0.0004  
(0.0003) 
0.0005**  
(0.0002) 
2007 0.0003  (0.0002) 
0.0002  
(0.0002)  
0.0005  
(0.0003) 
0.0003  
(0.0004)  
0.0002  
(0.0002) 
0.0002  
(0.0002) 
2008 0.0000  (0.0003) 
-0.0000  
(0.0003)  
0.0002  
(0.0005) 
0.0002  
(0.0006)  
-0.0000  
(0.0004) 
-0.0001  
(0.0003) 
2009 0.0010*  (0.0005) 
0.0010*  
(0.0005)  
0.0011  
(0.0009) 
0.0004  
(0.0009)  
0.0009  
(0.0006) 
0.0011  
(0.0007) 
2010 0.0006  (0.0006) 
0.0007  
(0.0006)  
0.0004  
(0.0007) 
0.0004  
(0.0008)  
0.0006  
(0.0007) 
0.0008  
(0.0006) 
2011 0.0005 (0.0007) 
0.0002  
(0.0006)  
0.0008  
(0.0011) 
0.0002  
(0.0010)  
0.0006  
(0.0008) 
0.0003  
(0.0008) 
2012 0.0001  (0.0005) 
0.0003  
(0.0006)  
0.0010  
(0.0011) 
0.0006  
(0.0012)  
-0.0003  
(0.0006) 
0.0002  
(0.0006) 
2013 -0.0016***  (0.0006) 
-0.0019*** 
(0.0005)  
0.0001  
(0.0010) 
-0.0007 
(0.0009)  
-0.0022***  
(0.0005) 
-0.0022*** 
(0.0005) 
2014 -0.0015***  (0.0003) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0003)  
-0.0009**  
(0.0004) 
-0.0006 
(0.0004)  
-0.0016***  
(0.0004) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
2015 -0.0013*** (0.0003) 
-0.0014*** 
(0.0003)  
-0.0007*  
(0.0004) 
-0.0010** 
(0.0005)  
-0.0015***  
(0.0003) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0004) 
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Table 7 Impact of ALLL Underestimations in 2013, 2014, and 2015 on Performance Measures of State-Chartered Public Banks 
This table presents the dollar amounts of the ALLL underestimations by state-chartered public banks between 2013 and 2015 and the impact of the underestimations 
on the banks’ performance measures. Column (1) lists the per-dollar-of-total-loan ALLL underestimations by state-chartered public banks as reported in Table 3. 
Column (2) lists the average dollar amount of total loans reported by state-chartered public banks as of December 31 of each sample year. Column (3) converts the 
per-dollar-of-total-loan ALLL underestimations to dollar amounts. Columns (4) to (7) list the average ALLL, income before taxes and extraordinary items, equity 
capital, and total risk-weighted assets reported by state-chartered public banks as of December 31 of each sample year, respectively. Columns (8) to (11) calculate 
the percentage of dollar-amount ALLL underestimations to the reported ALLL, income before taxes and extraordinary items, equity capital, and total risk-weighted 
assets, respectively. All dollar amounts are in thousands.  
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) (11) 
              
     As reported  ALLL underestimation as a % of reported 
 
ALLL 
underestimation 
(scaled by total 
loans) Total loans 
ALLL 
underestimation 
(dollar amount) 
 
ALLL 
Income 
before taxes 
and 
extraordinary 
items 
Equity 
capital 
Total risk-
weighted 
assets 
 
ALLL 
Income 
before taxes 
and 
extraordinary 
items 
Equity 
capital 
Total 
risk- 
weighted 
assets 
2013 -0.0022 4,725,987.10 10,397.17  72,400.82 122,482.07 881,567.19 5,824,877.20  14.4% 8.5% 1.2% 0.2% 
2014 -0.0016 5,220,139.60 8,352.22  70,289.27 122,074.84 919,869.67 6,059,285.30  11.9% 6.8% 0.9% 0.1% 
2015 -0.0015 5,893,455.60 8,840.18  68,001.22 153,240.54 1,162,645.04 7,683,280.20  13.0% 5.8% 0.8% 0.1% 
 
 
 
 
